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Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming 
Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data 
Farming Workshop is named after a 
farming implement. In farming, a 
scythe is used to clear and harvest. We 
hope that the “Scythe” will perform a 
similar role for our data farming 
community by being a tool to help 
prepare for our data farming efforts 
and harvest the results. The Scythe is 
provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu.  
Please contact the editors for 
additional paper copies.
Please let us know what you think of 
this fourth prototypical issue. Articles, 
ideas for articles and material, and 
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International Data Farming Community
Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of 
Data Farming, its methodologies, applications, 
tools, and evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the 
biannual International Data Farming Workshops, 
where researchers participate in team-oriented 
model development, experimental design, and 
analysis using high performance computing 
resources... that is, Data Farming. 
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International Data Farming Workshop 16 (IDFW 16) took place from April 13th through the 18th, 2008 in Monterey, California, 
USA.  Seventy-six participants from seven countries worked in eleven different teams exploring questions using Data Farming 
methods.  The theme was “Landscapes of Possibilities,” and the goal was to use our Data Farming methods to continue to 
explore our important questions.
Like IDFW 14, the workshop was hosted by the SEED Center for Data Farming at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California.  The plan for future workshops is to continue to hold even-numbered workshops once a year in Monterey 
with odd-numbered workshops taking place at international venues.
As the executive director of the Center, it is my pleasure to work with many from around the world to develop the methods 
of Data Farming and apply them to important questions of our day.  And on behalf of the co-directors of the SEED Center for 
Data Farming, Professors Tom Lucas and Susan Sanchez, I would like to express our thanks to the team leaders, the plenary 
speakers and all of the participants in IDFW 16.
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This issue, our fourth, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort as well as the plenary sessions.  As 
always, the plenary session materials, in-briefs, and out-briefs from this workshop are available online at http://harvest.nps.edu 
along with electronic copies of this issue of The Scythe. (Attendees will find an attached CD with this material as well as a 
collection of photographs from the week of the workshop.)  And now I would like to briefly outline the work of the eleven teams 
and invite you to examine the details of their efforts later in this issue of The Scythe. 
Team 1 used Pythagoras to explore the contribution of small-unmanned ground vehicles to small 
unit combat effectiveness.  The team developed a building-clearing scenario and examined 
different SUGV capabilities such as speed, sensor range, and vulnerability.
Team 2 built on the work of a completed NPS thesis, which examined questions 
regarding the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) using MANA.   The team illustrated the 
power of Data Farming by conducting over 40,000 replications to help understand the 
implications of a variety of possible red tactics.
Team 3 was an internationally co-led team, which used both the PAX and MANA 
models, and applied Automated Red Teaming to investigate different aspects of the 
same problem involving peace support operations.  The scenario used in this team’s Data 
Farming was based on a crowd control situation in a stabilization operation.  
Team 4 used the opportunity to participate in IDFW 16 to begin an effort using the 
agent-based sensor-effector model (ABSEM) recently developed in Germany.  They presented 
the main ideas of the ABSEM to learn from the available expertise and they plan to data farm an 
ABSEM prototype at IDFW 17.
Team 5  used the Logistics Battle Command model and experimental design techniques to assess 
the impact that Soldier level network enabled capabilities have on cargo operations at a truck 
terminal node within a sustainment base supporting a joint force.
Team 6 was led by personnel from the Joint Test and Evaluation Methodology 
program. This team applied design of experiments and Data Farming using MANA for 
developing evaluation strategies for testing in a joint environment.  
Team 7 not only won the best poster competition, but also used Data Farming to 
explore parameters and assumptions using the Total Life Cycle Management-
Assessment tool on a Marine Light Armored Vehicle.
Team 8 continued its uninterrupted IDFW string of advances in examining combat 
identification and fratricide.  At IDFW 16, they conducted Data Farming experiments 
using their  agent-based model, which represents situational awareness and the cognitive 
process to combine new sensor input with it to make identification decisions.
Team 9 used Pythagoras and a scenario developed for a prototype multi-agent system 
model of a civilian population to explore the response of the civilian population to insurgent, 
government, and stability force actions in a counterinsurgency environment.
Team 10 used the Joint Dynamic Allocation of Fires and Sensors (JDAFS) model, which is being reviewed as a tool to support 
Joint Starting Condition data development.  They explored a joint battlespace scenario in a Data Farming environment to identify 
possible improvements to JDAFS.
And finally, Team 11 built on research started in Canada on a systems dynamics model used to explore the use of non-lethal 
weapons in crowd confrontation situations.  They used Data Farming and design of experiments approaches to help determine 
the most sensitive parameters and develop a robust set of rules of engagement.
IDFW 16 was our third workshop in Monterey and it was once again a  forum for abundant international collaboration.  A 
special thanks to our technical lead from the SEED Center for Data Farming, Steve Upton, as well as the many efforts of our 
administrative lead Debbie Sandoval and her assistant Richard Sanchez.  And two more thank yous for a job well done goes to 
Ted Meyer for his expert work in putting together this issue of The Scythe and to Richard Mastowski for a great job editing. 
Please note that Ted and I can be contacted at datafarming@verizon.net with questions, comments or suggestions.
Now, looking ahead, our Data Farming community will  be back in Germany, where workshops 5 and 12 were held, for our 
next workshop: International Data Farming Workshop 17.  It will take place in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, starting with the opening 
dinner on Sunday, 21 September 2008 and continuing through the week with the closing session on Friday, 26 September.  We 
hope to see you there!
Gary Horne
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As part of the Army’s current transformation, robots are 
being integrated into force structure to reduce human risk. 
These mechanical “battle buddies” are being used for a 
myriad of tasks; however, there are currently no established 
standards for  measuring and evaluating their contribution to 
force combat effectiveness.  This research attempts to 
establish some metrics using essential elements of analysis 
(EEA), a SUGV functional decomposition hierarchy, 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of 
Performance (MOPs). Using these metrics, we will 
determine if the increased situational awareness provided by 
SUGVs and attached sensors improves combat effectiveness 
and mission accomplishment.  The primary SUGV functional 
capabilities (Figure 1) modeled were Gain Information 
(detect/identify agents), Move (speed), Survive 
(vulnerability), and Employ Effects (sensor ranges). The 
MOEs measured were the number of friendly forces killed 
(separating SUGVs and Soldiers), the number of enemy 
forces killed, and the overall combat effectiveness of the 
Small Combat Unit (SCU).  Pythagoras, an agent-based 
modeling program was used to develop the simulation. The 
scenario was based on a dismounted infantry platoon 
conducting building clearing operations as part of a  larger 
company level cordon and search mission in an urban 
environment. For comparison, excursions either included 
one SUGV or none.  It is our hope that results obtained will 
be beneficial to the U.S. armed forces for subsequent research 
or implementation into any military tactics, techniques, or 
procedures (TTPs) involving our new “battle buddies”.
Problem
Future Combat System projects that 40% of the military fleet 
may eventually be robotic. Current modeling and simulation 
studies on the performance of SUGVs are insufficient. 
Recognizing that doctrine and TTPs will  have to evolve, 
more research is needed.
Research Question
What SUGV capabilities contribute the most to improving a 
SCU’s combat effectiveness during building clearing 
operations in an urban environment?
SUGV Functional Decomposition
The SUGV functional decomposition hierarchy was 
developed from requirements found in the Future Combat 
Systems - Unit of Action Design Concept Baseline 
Description.  These requirements were used to create the six 
primary capabilities seen in Figure 1.  Each of the primary 
capabilities is decomposed to SUGV MOPs for building 
clearing operations. Based on the results we will transform 
these MOPs into MOEs in order to evaluate against our 
research question.
Figure 1: SUGV Functional Decomposition
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
    MOE 1:  Combat Effectiveness
(Initial Number Red Alive – Final Number Red Alive +1)
(Initial Number Blue Alive – Final Number Blue Alive +1)
The higher this ratio the more effective the SCU is.
    MOE 2:  Blue Force Mission Accomplishment
(Initial Number Blue Alive)
 (Initial Number Red Alive)
This MOE is determining the probability that the blue 
force wins given the above initial force ratio.
Scenario Description
A Future Force Warrior (FFW) Light Infantry Platoon (Fig 2) 
was tasked to clear two buildings within the center of a 
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small, urban, desert town and to observe a third building to 
the north.
The platoon leader, tasked 1st Squad to clear the primary 
objective (Building 1), tasked 2nd Squad to clear Building 2, 
and tasked 3rd Squad to observe Building 3.  On order, one 
team from 3rd Squad will provide additional support to 1st 
and 2nd Squads.  The weapons squad will establish support 
by fire positions south of Building 1 (Fig 3).
Each squad has its own SUGV to provide initial 
reconnaissance along the routes to each building, as well as 
to perform initial reconnaissance of the respective buildings 
in order to detect the presence of any persons.
The enemy situation is unclear.  Most recent intelligence 
reports place enemy elements within Buildings 1  and 2. 
However, this information is over 12 hours old at the time of 
the mission.
Figure 2: FFW Force Structure
Figure 3: Force Operation Concept and Maneuver Plan
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Design of Experiment (DOE)
Using a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
design, 32 design points were analyzed based on 9 factors. In 
consideration of total running time and allocation of limited 
computer assets, only 15 replications were run for each 
design point. This produced a total of 1485 observations.
Design Factors Min Max
Number of SUGVs 0 1
SUGV Speed (kph) 3 6
SUGV Vulnerability 0.1 0.99
Blue Force Speed (kph) 2 8
Number of Enemy (enemy 1) 1 9
SUGV SWIR Sensor Range (m) 800 1200
SUGV Thermal Sensor Range (m) 1300 1700
SUGV Optical Sight Range (m) 250 450
Blue Forceʼs Ability to Detect the Enemy 0.1 0.99
Table 1: Design of Experiment Factors.
Analysis of this experiment focused on the specific 
combat effectiveness and mission accomplishment of Team 
A, 1st Squad and its mission to clear Building 1.  Using the 
MOE ratios, only enemy 1 was compared to Team A. 
Although the size of enemy 1 was varied between one and 
nine, the size of Team A remained constant at four for all 
runs.
MOE 1: Combat Effectiveness
Initial analysis of the data found that the mean combat 
effectiveness of the team to be 1.09 + 0.95.   Next, a regression 
tree was created to find out how the factors interacted.
Figure 4: Regression Tree, Team A Combat Effectiveness
The upper portion of the regression tree shows that 
Team A has the highest mean combat effectiveness when it 
faces an enemy element that consists of fewer than six 
personnel.  Furthermore, if Team A’s ability to detect the 
enemy is greater than 0.41, then its combat effectiveness 
increases.
Using stepwise regression, the number of enemy, the 
blue forces ability to detect the enemy, SUGV speed, and 
SUGV’s thermal sensor range were found to be the most 
significant factors (Figure 5).
Although the SUGV’s speed and its thermal sensor 
range are significant, the number of enemy and blue force’s 
detection of the enemy are the most significant factors in this 
model.
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Figure 5: Significant Factors, Team A Combat Effectiveness
A least squares regression of the above four factors and 
two-way interactions between the four factors were 
calculated, but none of the interactions between the factors 
were significant.
MOE 2: Mission Accomplishment
For MOE 2, we wanted to see if the initial force ratio 
between blue and red forces, determined if the blue force 
was successful in completing its mission.
For evaluation of MOE 2, the blue force was successful if 
the final number of blue forces alive were greater than the 
final number of red forces alive.
Based on the factors varied in the experiment, a contour 
plot for Team A Mission Accomplishment was produced by 
looking at the blue force speed versus the number of enemy.
Figure 6: Team A Mission Accomplishment
This plot shows that the blue force is most successful 
when there are initially fewer than six enemy agents. 
Additionally, the blue force was more successful when they 
moved at speeds of 2 or 7 kph. 
Further analysis using a stepwise regression found the 
number of enemy, the blue force’s ability to detect the 
enemy, the SUGV’s vulnerability, and the SUGVs infrared 
(IR) sensor and optical sight ranges to be significant 
(Figure 7).
Figure 7: Significant Factors, Team A Mission Accomplishment
Observation of a contour plot of the most significant 
SUGV factors versus the initial number of enemy showed 
Team A accomplished its mission most often when the 
SUGV’s vulnerability was between 0.2 and 0.7 and when 
there were fewer than four enemy.
Figure 8: SUGV Vulnerability vs. Initial Number of Enemy (Team 
A Mission Accomplishment)
Finally we compared Team A’s Mission 
Accomplishment against different initial force ratios.  Team 
A does not begin to accomplish its mission until the force 
ratio is greater than 0.5 (Fig 9).   For this scenario, Team A 
accomplished its mission less than 30% of the time.
Figure 9: Team A Mission Accomplishment based on 
Initial Force Ratio
This chart shows that even with the SUGV as a combat 
multiplier  a leader needs to know the number of enemy that 
his unit is going to be fighting against.  If the unit is going to 
be outnumbered by more than 2  to 1 in a building clearing 
operation, then he will need an additional enabler.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on our analysis we concluded that a unit’s combat 
effectiveness and probability of success for building clearing 
operations is most dependent on the number of enemy that 
are located within the building. However a close second is 
the enemy detection rate. This is where the SUGV can 
contribute the most while limiting the risk to Soldiers 
conducting building clearing operations.   Our initial 
analysis found that the longer the SUGV is operational 
(vulnerability) the more persons it can detect in order to 
provide the unit leadership with the situational awareness 
needed to make critical decisions.  Also, the type and 
number of sensors that the SUGV is equipped with can 
contribute to unit situational awareness.  Both of these 
capabilities can contribute to the overall  success of the unit 
in accomplishing its mission.
While this study was not conclusive, it shows that 
SUGVs can be a critical asset in close combat situations. 
More research and modeling are still needed to determine 
what combinations of sensors provide the best situational 
awareness capabilities for leaders.
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Baseline Blue Plan Red Plan BlueART Red ARTManual ART Manual ART
Aggressiveness -60 -60 74 -60 -14 -22 -4
Cohesiveness -100 -100 -50 -100 -40 85 -16
Determination 60 60 9 60 33 -58 45
Red Mission Success 100% 82% 45% 100% 100% 2% 100%
Red Attrition 2.77 3.98 4.48 1.96 1.83 4.97 0.48
Neutral Attrition 2.21 1.06 0.52 3.05 3.15 0.03 4.52
% Drop
(Red Mission Success) - 16% 55% 0% 0% 98% 0%
% Increase
(Red Attrition) - 44% 80% (29%) (34%) 79% (83%)
% Drop
( Neutral Attrition) - 52% 76% (38%) (43%) 99% (105%)
Table 1: Summary of Results
Team 2: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission 
Packages: Determining the Best Mix
TEAM 2 MEMBERS
LT Benjamin ABBOTT, USN 
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
LT Chad KAISER, USN 
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
LCDR Mike MILLIKEN, USN




The threat facing the U.S. Navy is changing from 
engagement in blue water to combat in the littorals.  In order 
to meet this threat, the U.S. Navy built the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) — a high speed, shallow draft, focused-mission 
platform capable of operating independently, as a squadron, 
or as part of a Carrier/Expeditionary Strike Group (CSG/
ESG).1   As with every new platform, many questions 
regarding the employment of LCS are still  unanswered. 
How many LCS should comprise a squadron?   What mix of 
mission packages should be employed within the squadron? 
Previous research has addressed the above questions using 
data farming techniques (i.e., Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercubes (NOLH)) with an agent based model called Map 
Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA).  Simulating over 
40,000 littoral engagements in three warfare areas, Surface 
Warfare (SUW), Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine 
Warfare (MIW), LT Abbott showed that a squadron of six to 
ten LCSs and a compositional rule of thumb of five LCSs 
configured for  the primary threat and two configured for a 
secondary threat produced lower blue casualties while 
increasing red casualties.2   This research, however, did not 
take into consideration the use of tactics by the red force. 
Team 2 investigated the impact of red force tactics on the 
results found in LT Abbott’s research. 
Description of Scenarios
The three warfare areas analyzed in the original research 
were each given a scenario to model the use of an employed 
LCS squadron:
• In the SUW scenario, a squadron of LCS is used to 
clear a choke point of a missile boat threat in advance 
of a CSG; enemy submarines may also be present.
• In the ASW scenario, a squadron of LCS is used to 
clear a strait of submarines which may be protected by 
missile boats.
• In the MIW scenario, a squadron of LCS must detect 
and neutralize a mine field that is blocking a  shipping 
lane and may be guarded by missile boats.
No alterations were made to the scenarios of the original 
research with the exception of placement of the red forces.
MODELING
In order to maintain integrity with the original work, design 
points meeting the recommendations (i.e., squadron size of 
six to ten, and mission package mix) were selected from each 
warfare area.  This produced 16 design points for the SUW 
scenario, 14 for the ASW scenario, and 19 for  the MIW 
scenario.  Figure 1 shows the design points used for the SUW 
scenario. Since the focus is on tactics, the parameters of the 
design points were not changed nor were the personality 
weightings in MANA for the blue or red forces.  
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1 Commander Naval Surface Forces, Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations (Revision B), 2 Jan 2007.
2 Abbott, Benjamin P., “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Packages:  Determining the Best Mix,” M.S. in Operations 
Research, March 2008.
Figure 1:  Design points used in the SUW scenario
Placement of the red forces, however, were changed to 
simulate different tactics that a red force may employ.  For 
each scenario, two tactics were created through red teaming 
by Team 2, which were then replicated 30 times across each 
design point.  Table 1 summarizes the red tactics Team 2 
created for use in the simulation. 
Scenario Red Tactic One Red Tactic Two
SUW
Submarines form a barrier 
at the mouth of the choke 
point.  Missile boats 
unchanged.
Missile boats are assembled 
in a U-shaped formation just 
south of the submarines.  
Submarines unchanged.
ASW
Submarines are placed in 
four separate boxes in a 
cross like pattern.  Missile 
boats unchanged.
Missile boats are placed in 
the center of the channel to 
the north of the ubmarines.  
MIW
Missile boats are placed in 
front of the mine field to 
prevent detection.  Mines 
unchanged.
Missile boats are split into 
two elements, one placed in 
front of and one behind the 
mine field.  Mines 
unchanged.
Table 1:  Red tactics determined by Team 2
Figure 2 shows a screen shot of the MIW scenario at 
problem start with the original research placement and red 
tactics illustrated.
Figure 2:  Screen shot of MIW scenario at problem start
RESULTS
After simulating over 1400 littoral operations, the results of 
each tactic per warfare area were compared to the data 
provided by the original research.  In order to grasp the 
significance of red tactics, the Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) chosen by the team are percent of LCS killed and 
percent of red killed.  In the MIW and ASW areas, minor 
variations in the MOEs were observed and the results of the 
original work were confirmed—specifically LCS operating in 
areas where there are more than ten enemy submarines. 
Figure 3 shows the comparison of the results for ASW area.
The SUW area showed minor variations in percent of 
LCS killed, but instances of large increases in percentage of 
red killed.  This was due to the ability of the SUW LCS to 
engage the missile boats while crossing the submarine screen. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the impact of the different tactics on 
the blue and red forces for the SUW scenario.
Figure 3:  Comparison of the results for the ASW scenario
Figure 4:  Minor variations in LCS casualties 
were observed in the SUW scenario
Figure 5:  SUW scenario shows large increases 
in percentage of red killed
CONCLUSIONS
The results obtained by Team 2 solidify the original research 
and illustrates the power of data farming—conducting over 
40,000 replications provides insight over a large spectrum. 
These results also suggest that MANA indirectly models 
tactics for both blue and red forces, when the agents are not 
assigned waypoints and required to follow them closely. 
This is due to MANA’s re-seeding at each replication causing 
agents to start in different locations within their  assigned 
home.  As they follow their personalities they loosely apply 
many variations of tactics.  Further research can be 
conducted on the impact of changing the personality 
weightings of both blue and red forces, as well as the use of 
Automated Red Teaming (ART) and other evolutionary 
algorithms in determining tactics for both forces.
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INTRODUCTION
The team’s objective was to explore how an Operational 
Synthesis approach, i.e. making use of a variety of models 
and tools to investigate different aspects of the same 
problem, could improve the overall  quality of the analysis. 
The scenario on crowd control in a stabilization operation 
used by Team 03 at IDFW 15 was the test case for this 
exploration. MANA and Automated Red Teaming (ART) 
were applied to identify the scenario with the most 
challenging demonstrator behavior.  This "worst case" 
scenario was then represented in PAX1  to investigate 
questions related to the effect of military Rules of 
Engagement (RoEs) on civilians and effects of escalation 
caused by civilians through the use of the PAX Analysis 
Toolbox.
OPERATIONAL SYNTHESIS
Operational Synthesis (see Figure 1) is a process which 
focuses on looking at the whole rather than reducing 
systems into parts. The goal of Operational Synthesis can be 
expressed as utilizing each individual tool for what it is good 
at, and combining the result in a manner that synthesizes the 
resultant wealth of information.
Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of Operational Synthesis
Scenario
The scenario examined during the workshop was based on a 
crowd control "Demonstration" situation in a stabilization 
operation, similar to the scenario examined by Team 3 
during IDFW 15. The team’s intention was to use this 
scenario as a test-case for exploring the process of 
conducting Operational Synthesis. (See Figure 2 for the 
geographical disposition of the various constituents of the 
scenario)
Figure 2: 3D view of the scenario layout
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1 Note that a 1:1 representation of one and the same scenario in two different simulation models is hardly ever possible. Instead, 
the team captured the main features of the scenario, especially with regard to the aspects relevant and under observation with 
PAX.
In the scenario, an event organized by political-religious 
Party A was taking place in a town hall  in a part of a town 
predominantly inhabited and controlled by Party B.  When 
the event ended, Party A members had the intention to leave 
the town hall as soon as possible and return home via a road 
heading south.  The Peacekeeping force PAXFOR received 
intelligence reports that a group of Party B members, known 
for their political disagreement with Party A and aggressive in 
behavior, had announced that a demonstration march would 
be carried out towards the location where Party A members 
were meeting.  In addition, a small group of young Party B 
members, known for possible violent actions and persistent 
intent to cause harm to Party A members, were expected to 
join in this counter-demonstration.  Party B members had the 
intent to hold the demonstration outside the town hall and 
confront Party A members when they were leaving the town 
hall.  The PAXFOR identified the possibility that Party A and 
Party B members would be injured due to the confrontation 
and intended to separate the two groups by forming a 
separation line in front of the town hall.  
Questions
"What would be particularly challenging situations that may 
arise, and the  RoEs that would be helpful to the peacekeepers  in 
these situations?"
The Process
Based on the questions and the scenario, and taking into 
consideration the strengths and limitations of MANA, PAX 
and ART, the team developed the proposed iterative process 
for an Operational Synthesis (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Iterative process for Operational Synthesis
Step 1: Identifying questions and defining an 
appropriate MOE to address the real world problem.
The team discussed the need to focus on a single common 
MOE that would be relevant to the question and ideally 
could be obtained from both the MANA and PAX models. 
However, as MANA and PAX are designed to study different 
aspects of operational problems, they naturally have 
different sets of MOEs.  After some deliberation, "Wounded 
Party A members" was chosen as the "common" MOE.
Step 2: Developing and implementing the scenario 
in MANA; performing single runs and identifying 
parameters that are relevant to the study.
After the scenario was developed in MANA (see Figure 4), it 
was decided that a second line of Peacekeepers be included 
in the demonstration area to make the "blue" plan more 
robust and more effective in separating the Party A and 
Party B members.  The intention of adding the second line of 
Peacekeepers would be to help deter and repel any Party B 
demonstrators who managed to penetrate through the first 
separation line. It was also decided that the scenario would 
be more challenging if the Party B  violent youths were to 
mix within Party B demonstrators and approach directly 
from the front of the separation lines.
Figure 4: Geographical representation of MANA scenario
Step 3: Applying ART to the MANA scenario and 
evaluating the performance of the MOE based on 
generated changes to the parameters. Interpreting 
the parameter improvement with perspective of the 
real world problem.
The scenario developed in MANA was submitted for ART 
runs. The objective was to identify challenging movement 
and behavior emerged from Party B parameters that would 
maximize the number of wounded Party A members.
The following set of parameters was included to be 
varied within the specified range of values in the ART 
submission (Table 1):
Parameters submitted to ART Parameter Values in MANA
Baseline Min Max
Party B Demonstrators
















Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps), i.e. 
when will they back off.
100 10 200
Duration of Backing off (time 
steps), i.e. when will they come 
back to confront the PAXFOR 
again.
100 10 200
Party B Violent Youths
















Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps)
100 10 200
Table 1: Submitted parameters and range of values
The ART submission was sent to the cluster in Singapore 
and the results presented in Table 2 were obtained:
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Parameters submitted to ART Parameter Values in MANA
Baseline Best Results from 
ART
Party B Demonstrators
Starting Location (along horizontal 
axis)
450 471
Cohesiveness during Movement -30 33
Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps)
100 64
Duration of Backing off (time steps) 100 35
Party B Violent Youths
Starting Location (along horizontal 
axis)
450 445
Cohesiveness during Movement -30 4
Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (timesteps)
50 194






Table 2: Comparing parameter values and MOE values of the best 
case with regard to Party B from ART run
It was evident that ART was able to increase the number 
of wounded Party A members from the original 25 out of 60 
(42%) in the baseline to 60 (100%) in the ART scenario.  
Figure 5: Emergent movement of the 
Party B members based on ART output
Figure 6: Emergent interaction behavior of the 
Party B members based on ART output
Two key points optimizing Party B's tactics were 
observed in the "ART-ed" scenario:
1. Concentrate demonstration on one section of the 
line to overwhelm the peacekeepers. (Figure 5)
2. Optimal interaction and back-off times that will 
keep large numbers of the Party B members 
between the lines. (Figure 6)
Step 4: Based on the interpretations of the ART 
results, deducing adaptations for the PAX and 
integrating them in the PAX scenario.
The resulting movement and behavior of Party B 
members identified from the MANA-ART effort were 
transferred to the PAX scenario, as applicable. Due to 
difference of the grid size in the PAX scenario only the group 
ratios were kept consistent across the MANA and PAX 
scenarios (Figure 7)
Figure 7: Geographical disposition of agents within PAX model
Step 5: Performing design of experiment and 
running data farming on PAX.  Performing analysis 
on the PAX output.
With the challenging Party B behavior modeled in the 
PAX scenario, the team proceeded to address another aspect 
of the questions, which was on the possible RoEs that the 
peacekeepers could adopt to reduce the number of wounded 
Party A members. For this purpose, the team developed a new 
rule set, shown in Figure 8, which was based on the IDFW15 
rule set but did not include any arrests, to compare this new 
rule set to the IDFW15 one as well as the "default" rule sets 
"PSO Manual" and "Gandhi."
Figure 8: PAX rule set developed at IDFW16
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In addition to examining the rule set, the team also 
decided to investigate two other factors that could not be 
represented in MANA, but were of interest with regard to the 
PSO aspects that can be modeled in PAX. Namely, the initial 
readiness for aggression of the Party B members and the 
deterrence effect by the presence of the peacekeepers (the so-
called "dog factor") were selected as additional factors for the 
upcoming Data Farming experiment.
Finally a full factorial design of experiment as shown in 
Table 3, consisting of a total of 4480 runs (224 variations x 20 
replicates), was submitted to the 128 node cluster of the 
Simulation and Test Environment of the German Bundeswehr.
Full Factorial Farming Parameters Min Max Step Size
Party B counter-demonstrators readiness for 
aggression 30 90 10
Party B counter-demonstrators dog factor 0.1 1.5 0.2
Soldiers' rule set 1 4 1
Table 3: Parameters varied in full factorial design study
When analyzing this study, one of the immediate findings 
was that in the PAX scenario hardly any Party A member was 
actually ever injured (see Figure 9) as opposed to almost every 
one being injured in the respective MANA scenario. This 
confirmed the group's expectation that the "same" scenario, 
modeled in different simulation models, will almost certainly 
take a different course of events and hence the results will be 
different, even if the names of the MOEs under consideration 
may be the same. In this particular case, the reasons for this 
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• The criteria of when to consider a civilian "wounded" 
are different in PAX and MANA.
• The RoEs of the soldiers modeled in PAX were quite 
different from and comprised more detail than their 
reactions in MANA.
• The civilians' complex behavior model in PAX, 
especially with regard to emotional factors, was very 
different from the rather simplistic behavior of the 
civilians scripted in MANA.
Figure 9: Number of wounded Party A members 
with IDFW16 rule set
One of the "lessons learned" the team drew from this was 
that, instead of comparing the two models and the course of 
events of the scenario in each, we should concentrate on the 
parameters and aspects the team had not even been able to 
model in MANA in the first place. This, in fact, complies with 
one of the team's key objectives: the ability to observe a 
problem from different perspectives using various tools and 
thus gain insights into various aspects of the problem at hand 
that could not have been obtained by using just one of the 
tools or models.
To point out one example, we will  explain one of the 
team's findings with regard to the aggregated level of 
escalation caused by the civilians (i.e. aggressive actions 
performed by the respective civilians).
The group noticed that with the second line of soldiers 
the overall escalation shows a roughly polynomial decrease 
with respect to Party B's military dog factor as opposed to a 
roughly linear decrease observed with the original IDFW15 
scenario (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: Comparison of the PAX scenarios with regard to the 
MOE "Aggregated Escalation by Civilians"
First of all, this confirms the rather obvious expectation 
that escalation can be kept low by either  having more soldiers 
in the area or increasing the soldiers' deterrence effect by any 
means. In addition to this, however, the results of the PAX 
study suggest that with an increasing number of soldiers their 
individual deterrence effect, at least above a certain threshold, 
becomes even more efficient.
In other words, the analysis shows that with the second 
line of peacekeepers the PSO force is able to keep the 
escalation level very low even with a rather  reasonable  ability to 
deter the demonstrators. As a side-effect, this deployment is 
more robust with regard to the counter-demonstrators' 
readiness for aggression.
Further analyses, such as comparison of the different rule 
sets, were performed by the team but will not be described 
here for the sake of brevity.
Step 6: Applying the analysis result to gain insights 
to the questions identified for the real world 
problem.
This is essentially the final step.  However, as the scenario 
was used as a test-case only rather than to examine a real 
operational problem, this step was not executed methodically. 
Although some very basic tendencies could be derived by 
using the respective strengths of both MANA and PAX, such 
as the introduction of a second line of soldiers and some 
possible conclusions as to the soldiers' RoEs, further actions 
would have to be taken to be able to perform this step.
To mention just a few, a much more detailed preparation 
of the scenarios, a more thorough analysis as well as further 
interpretation of the findings by military experts would 
certainly be necessary to draw conclusions with the 
confidence required for applying the results to a real-world 
problem.
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CONCLUSION
Challenges of Operational Synthesis
Throughout the week, the team also discussed and noted the 
experiences with and the challenges of Operational 
Synthesis:
3. Identifying questions and common MOE. 
Identifying a common MOE that allows analysis to 
be conducted to address these questions was a 
challenge.  Models like MANA and PAX would 
represent and measure effects of actions differently 
and hence certain MOEs, although named similarly, 
may not be measuring the same effects within the 
models.  Hence if a common MOE is desired it 
would be important to establish what would be the 
relevant and common MOE(s) when dealing with 
different models to avoid confusion during the 
analysis stage.
4. Representing common aspects of a scenario in 
different models.  Although it was possible to 
achieve cosmetic and physical similarity between 
different models like MANA and PAX, it is difficult 
to make different agent-based models function and 
emerge in a similar  way to generate comparable 
results. One possible conclusion could be to put 
more effort on functional instead of parametric 
similarity so that similar effects would be 
represented in the two models. On the other hand, 
the team's experience has rather indicated that it is 
generally not even desirable to make two models 
behave exactly the same way since that eventually 
breaks down to having just one ("synchronized") 
model instead of making full use of the benefits of 
having different models to study different aspects 
and probably even different vignettes of a question.
5. Transferring analysis findings between models. 
Since MANA and PAX are different models, the 
results obtained from the ART runs on MANA 
would not be directly transferable to the PAX 
model, at least in the parametric sense.  The main 
challenge would be to decide how best to represent 
these MANA findings in the PAX model.  
Benefits of Operational Synthesis
6. Better understanding of  the models. First of all, the 
use of different tools and models broadens the 
analysts' horizon and gives them insight into the 
models that goes far beyond simply using one and 
the other. Due to the necessity to carefully set up 
analyses and experiments with more than one 
model and then comparing their results a deeper 
understanding of the internal operation of each of 
them is required and obtained.
7. More comprehensive analysis capabilities.  The 
Operational Synthesis approach enabled the team 
to look at the question set from different angles and 
on different operational levels. Thus the whole 
process and the combination of tools, models and 
methods thoroughly enhances the ability to 
develop, test and elaborate RoEs as well as Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).
8. Further applications. Beside the advantages afore-
mentioned, the methodology seems to be very well 
applicable to the calibration and validation of 
simulation models, for example. Using ART to 
"optimize" a scenario towards a result observed in 
the real world as well  as the deep understanding of 
the model gained during the whole process of 
Operational Synthesis promise to be tremendously 
helpful during model calibration and validation.
Summary
As mentioned earlier, the team objective in this workshop 
was to focus on exercising and gaining insights on the 
process of Operational Synthesis, rather than examining a 
real operational problem.  Through this exploration, the 
team discovered the key benefits of the Operational 
Synthesis approach.  In particular, the approach allowed 
high-level as well as low-level resolution analyses.  Deeper 
insights on the dynamics of the scenario and models could 
be gained.  The team had also gathered many useful insights 
on the challenges of executing the Operational Synthesis 
process.  Last but not least, the team had benefited greatly 
from a truly international collaborative effort as many useful 
ideas and insights were contributed by participants from 
Singapore, Germany, New Zealand and the United States.
In summary, the Operational Synthesis approach as 
performed by Team 3 promises to provide a new quality to the 
analysis of (Peace Support) Operations by enabling the 
analyst to take into consideration a variety of aspects and 
questions otherwise unaccounted for. Nevertheless, further 
work and research has to be done to improve the tool support 
and integration (e.g. providing Automated Red Teaming 
support for PAX) on the one hand but also formalizing the 
possibilities and limitations of the approach to make the best 
and most efficient use of it.
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During previous Data Farming workshops, different 
representatives of the German Federal Office of Defense 
Technology and Procurement and EADS were concentrating 
on the simulation of technical aspects in network centric 
operations (NCO). In the respective working groups, the 
main focus was on analyzing the influence of networked 
sensors and effectors on military capabilities and the 
operational outcome. 
Those studies showed, however, that the existing agent-
based models are rather limited in terms of modeling and 
simulating complex technical systems on a sound physical 
basis. 
For this reason, the German Federal Office of Defense 
Technology and Procurement decided to develop a new 
agent-based model that fulfills the requirements to be used for 
analyzing the combination of various sensor and effector 
systems in NCO while taking into account the underlying 
physical theories. This model called ABSEM (agent-based 
sensor-effector  model) is currently under development, a first 
prototype is planned to be presented to the international Data 
Farming Community at IDFW 17.
Team Activities
The team's main intention during IDFW16 was to learn from 
the available international expertise and experiences in 
building new models and designing a flexible and generic 
architecture for a data-farmable and modular multi-agent 
system for modeling sensor-effector physics. 
For this reason, team 4 presented the main ideas and 
concepts of the ABSEM during a plenary session and put up 
the whole topic for discussion in a particular ABSEM focus 
group.
ABSEM Requirements
Particularly based on the work accomplished during the 
previous International Data  Farming Workshops and 
looking on specific scenarios, a whole list of requirements 
could be identified that needs to be taken into account when 
building a new model for rather technical analyses of sensor-
effector-systems. Those include for instance considering a 
three-dimensional representation of the terrain and the 
model entities, but also different types of terrain and 
accordingly the respective impact on both the agents' 
behavior and the sensor / effector systems. Apart from that, 
the model must provide a possibility to model different 
types of agents and entities (like soldiers, civilians, transport 
agents, vehicles, aircraft) by specifying the corresponding 
characteristics (e.g. speed, size, energy consumption,…).
However, the model's main goal is to analyze different 
sensor   /   effector systems within a dynamic environment. 
Therefore it is essential to allow for an arbitrary number of 
sensors and effectors that can be stored in templates to be 
reused by all agents and in any scenario. Possible sensor 
systems might be
• Human viewing (without any visual aids)
• Electro optical devices
• Night vision devices (residual light amplifier, infrared)
• Radar devices
• Sonar devices
The main focus in ABSEM will be to support different 
levels of abstraction and to allow for integrating sophisticated 
physical models when determining a sensor's range and 
detection / identification probability, but also when 
computing an effector's hit probability. 
This implies that sensor parameters like the aperture 
angle, the resolution (spatial frequency), the sensitivity or also 
the search rate with respect to the field of view and field of 
search need to be considered.  Regarding an effector's hit 
probability, influencing factors like the distance to the target, 
the terrain (line-of-sight, concealment) or the target size must 
be examined.
ABSEM Concepts
To be able to support different levels of abstraction, ABSEM 
allows for subsuming several real objects in one agent. After 
all, the model's efficiency and performance significantly 
depends on the number of agents involved.
There are three different types of model entities. 
Embedded systems are model elements that are attached to a 
certain parent object. They don't have any own, self-
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contained or dynamic behavior and only exist as long as their 
host entity exists.  An agent, by contrast, is a completely 
autonomous system that is provided with its own dynamic 
behavior. An agent acts and reacts self-contained. It is not 
possible to directly change an agent's state. Instead, an agent 
perceives information from the environment, processes this 
information and then updates its own state and reacts if 
necessary. An aggregated entity finally is an agent that 
models the group behavior of two or more subordinate 
entities. Depending on the underlying scenario and the given 
question set, the sensors  /  effectors in ABSEM for instance 
may be either modeled as an embedded entity that is 
assigned to any other agent, or as an agent itself.
The agents' actual behavior results from a set of tasks or 
objectives the agent currently tries to pursue. Examples are 
various motion tasks, like patrol, follow, and escape, but, of 
course, also attacks or the task to defend or protect some area 
or other entities. Furthermore, ABSEM will consider 
communication and transportation tasks. Any task definition 
is always state-oriented. That is, the task only determines 
what has to be achieved, but it doesn't give any information 
about how. So, it's up to the agent to decide, how this task is 
going to be fulfilled. 
Regarding the sensor and effector modeling, most 
existing simulation models use a very simplistic approach to 
determine the probability for detecting or hitting a target 
object, often not taking into account the terrain or specific 
characteristics of the sensor   /   effector. Within ABSEM, a 
rather detailed physical approach is to be used. The goal is to 
integrate parameters that are physically measurable—
meaning that if you identify a certain model parameter 
within your Data Farming analysis that seems to be very 
important for a given MOE, this parameter can also be 
transferred to a specific real-world parameter.
ABSEM User Interfaces
In ABSEM both an online- and an offline-animation is to be 
supported. The offline-animation is often very helpful when 
analyzing single runs and if you want to jump back and 
forth in simulation time. Depending on the analysis 
objectives, a 2D- or alternatively a 3D-visualization is more 
appropriate. Apart from visualizing interactions between 
individual agents, information windows showing agent-
specific information or technical information about the 
weapons or sensors in use will help in understanding what's 
going on and why the agents behave the way they do.
To realize all that, an integrated 2D and 3D visualization 
tool developed by EADS is to be used. This tool already fulfils 
part of the ABSEM requirements, at least regarding the 
visualization However, so far, no editing functionalities are 
supported, thus still need to be added.
Since ABSEM is also meant do be used within the Data 
Farming process, a link is to be created to the Data Farming 
GUI. In a few words, this Data Farming GUI enables the user 
to setup new Data Farming experiments in a very comfortable 
way. The progress of any experiment that is currently running 
on the connected computer cluster may be observed and the 
generated results may be analyzed using a corresponding 
analysis service. Altogether, this Data Farming GUI supports 
the three data farming phases experiment definition, 
experiment execution and experiment analysis and thus 
simplifies enormously the whole Data Farming process.
Summary
During IDFW16 team 4 got a lot of valuable feedback from 
the international partners that will be kept in mind in the 
following conceptual work. 
The next step will be to implement a first ABSEM 
prototype that includes at least some of the described concepts 
and which will be available at the next International Data 
Farming Workshop 17 in September in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen.
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INTRODUCTION
Several joint and service concepts, logistics studies and 
analyses, as well as government sponsored studies recognize 
that the current distribution system is characterized by 
deficient in-transit visibility (ITV), networked 
communications, and information system that provide 
network-wide visibility of node and mode status in a shared 
logistics common operating picture (LCOP).  These 
deficiencies jeopardize the ability to build a sustainment 
system that ensures that the right supplies and services will 
arrive on time and location when needed. 
Because the current communications network does not 
support current force requirements, individual units and 
commands have supplemented their  units with a myriad of 
commercial wireless technologies procured in an ad hoc 
manner with operational, discretionary, and supplemental 
dollars, to augment or replace tactical networks, despite 
interoperability, security, and spectrum issues.  In fact, those 
commercial wireless technologies serve as systems and as 
network enablers to fill current network-enabled capability 
needs.  Recent studies, anecdotal evidence obtained from 
operational needs, integrated priority lists, and collected 
operational lessons suggest that seamless integration of 
individual soldier-level wireless tactical networking devices 
prevalent in support operations areas require a 
comprehensive independent analysis.  Consequently, TRAC-
Monterey is conducting a Capability Based Assessment (CBA) 
to identify network-enabled capability gaps for CSS soldiers 
and to identify potential solutions to fill those gaps. 
IDFW 16 OBJECTIVES
This working group’s overall objective for IDFW 16 was to 
use the Logistics Battle Command (LBC) model, a new battle 
command simulation developed by TRAC-Monterey, and 
experimental design techniques to assess the impact that 
soldier level network-enabled capabilities have on cargo 
operations at a truck terminal node within a sustainment 
base supporting a joint force. 
Particularly, the specific objectives of Team 5 sessions 
during IDFW 16 included: 
1. Represent the different network structures and 
distribution of enablers in LBC. 
2. Develop measures of effectiveness (MOE) and 
confirm that LBC can produce required MOEs.
3. Develop experimental  design to examine factors of 
interest to issues of analysis.
4. Explore network-enabled capabilities and 
distribution of enablers through experimental 
design.
5. Run DOE for model on the cluster to determine 
how network-enabled capabilities affect 
performance. 
LBC MODEL
The LBC model is a low-resolution, object oriented, 
stochastic, and discrete event model programmed in Java 
and incorporates Simkit.  LBC functionality includes 
planning and decision support features to enable a simulated 
sustainment decision maker to monitor the LCOP, forecast 
demand for most classes of supply, and initiate and adjust 
missions to distribute supplies and perform sustainment 
functions.  LBC model uses network architectures to 
represent the distribution pipeline to summon sustainment 
planning and execution representing the end-to-end flow of 
resources from supplier to point of consumption.
The LBC model uses nodes and arcs to represent the 
different networks of the distribution system.  The LBC model 
accomplishes this through three layers of network 
representation: the transportation, communications, and 
planning networks.  First, the transportation network links 
LBC model to the physical area of operations representing the 
geographical distribution of supplies, and allows for dynamic 
route planning.  Second, the communications network 
represents an arbitrary complex communications network of 
the distribution system linking leaders and soldiers to all 
applicable stakeholders including the LCOP.  Last, the 
planning network represents the data of the distribution 
system information network. 
SCENARIO
The scenario selected focuses on operations at a  terminal 
node of the theater distribution system: namely, a 
Centralized Receiving Shipping Point (CRSP).  A CRSP is 
16 - IDFW 16 - Team 5
dock to dock distribution center, within an area of operations 
where cargo is delivered, sorted, shipped, and backhaul 
cargo is picked up 24/7.  The objective is to continuously 
move cargo quickly and efficiently using regular 
sustainment deliveries from theater to a  CRSP, employing 
the familiar  “hub and spoke” concept.  Typically, Army 
Transportation Soldiers operate the CRSP.
The scenario concentrates on Transportation Soldiers 
operating the CRSP different sections, especially the container 
lane, pallet lane, rolling stock lane, and the operations center 
to process cargo received from regular sustainment convoys 
composed of thirty trucks with different commodities. 
Network Structures
Representing network structures on LBC is the first objective 
the workgroup addressed.  The scenario built was designed 
to assess three network structures and the ability to 
accomplish the mission in the assigned scenario. 
Incorporating network-enabled capabilities in the scenario 
involves connecting various lanes as nodes in the 
communications network providing timely and accurate 
information.  The three network structures implemented in 
LBC to explore network-enabled capability are Hierarchical, 
Star, and Fully Connected network structures.
First, the Hierarchical network structure represents a 
topology which outlines the interconnection of five network-
enabled nodes through four communication channels in a 
hierarchical manner.  Second, the star network structure 
delineates a topology in which each of the four nodes of the 
network within the terminal node are connected to the 
network central  node, with a point-to-point link through four 
communications channels in a hub and spoke fashion.  Finally, 
the Fully Connected network structure represents a type of 
network topology in which each of the five nodes of the 
network are connected to each of the other nodes in the 
network with a point-to-point link through seven 
communications channels or arcs making it possible for data 
to be simultaneously transmitted from any single node to all 
of the other nodes.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The second objective addressed was the development of 
MOEs.  The three primary MOEs of interest developed are 
Velocity, Reliability, and Visibility.  They were derived 
directly from the concept specific attributes listed in the Joint 
Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Capabilities (JIC) 
(2006) in order to provide the linkage from the specific 
mission tasks to the estimated operational outcomes for each 
scenario.  This approach clearly provides decision makers 
with the traceability of capability gaps to required 
capabilities.  Below is a discussion of the MOEs of interest.
• Velocity is the speed at which convoys are processed in 
the terminal node.  Convoys must be processed with 
the right resources at the right speed with reliability. 
Convoy wait time influences velocity.  Wait time is 
defined, Service Factor * Utilization Factor *  Variation 
Factor.  As wait time decreased, Velocity increases. 
• Reliability is the degree of assurance or dependability 
that cargo terminal operations will consistently meet 
convoy demands under established conditions to 
specified standards.  Reliability measures the variance 
of the convoy wait time.
• Visibility is the capability to determine the status, 
location, and direction of flow of materiel.  This MOE 
provide a measure of the impact of network-enabled 
capabilities.  It quantifies the difference between the 
ground truth stock levels and the LCOP levels. 
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
A Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design was 
constructed (see Table 1) to develop several experiments 
based on a range of inputs for  seven factors.  The decision 
factors considered are ITV-available, ITV-accuracy, LCOP-
update, latency, and probability of communications.  These 
are the parameters that influence network capability for the 
scenario.  The noise factors are resources available, and 
convoys per hour which allow examining the impact of 
network capability aspects on a broader base.  These factors 
were derived directly from concept specific attributes listed 
in the Net-Centric Operational Environment (NCOE) JIC 
(2006).  For simplicity, the factors were considered 
continuous and integer.  Below is a discussion of the factors 
of interest developed by the workgroup.
• ITV-Available represents the probability to which 
personnel at the terminal node are provided with 
timely, reliable access to ITV data of cargo. 
• ITV-Accuracy represents the likelihood of the ITV data 
of cargo transmitted matches received information 
given ITV-Available
• LCOP Update is the rate in hours at which nodes 
update the LCOP.
• Probability of  communications corresponds to the 
probability of successful communication between 
nodes given point-to-point link.  
• Latency refers to the message transmission delay in 
hours. 
• Resources available accounts for the amount of materiel 
handling equipment available for operations at the 
terminal node.
• Convoys per hour are the amount of convoys arriving at 
the terminal node in an hour interval.
Table 1: NOLH Design
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RESULTS
Due to limitations of the current configuration of the LBC 
simulation, examination of the data sets revealed that 
additional modifications and improvements were required 
by the LBC developers to improve model functionality and 
correct program anomalies.
CONCLUSIONS
The work accomplished throughout IDFW16 was valuable. 
Team 5 participants developed a scenario, network 
structures, MOEs, and DOE to measure the impact of 
network-enabled capability using the LBC model to support 
TRAC-Monterey’s CBA.  Further, throughout the working 
week substantial revisions and expansions of the LBC model 
were accomplished to improve the functionality and 
usability of the model as an analysis tool for the operational 
scenario of interest. 
The way ahead is to develop the capability of LBC to 
handle an experimental design of a large amount of factors to 
provide analysts with the capability to conduct exploratory 
studies and develop credible response surfaces.  Furthermore, 
continue to explore additional factors to identify network-
enabled capability gaps and identify efficiencies in 
sustainment operations resulting from network-enabled 
forces. 
18 - IDFW 16 - Team 5
Overview of 
Plenary Sessions
A Landscape of Knowledge Sharing
As is traditional, the members of the data farming 
community enjoyed and benefitted from sharing insights 
and knowledge gained through independent activities. 
IDFW 16 incorporated a full  suite of plenary sessions that 
run the gamut of disciplines related to data farming. 
Summaries of most of the plenaries are provided here. 
Besides the plenaries highlighted on this page, talks also 
included a session on Data Farming  for Newcomers by Gary 
Horne and sessions on Design of Experiments and a SEED 
Center Update by Susan Sanchez and Tom Lucas. 
Gudrun Wagner, Team 4, lead a session on An Agent Based 
Sensor Effector Model which is summarized in the Team 4 
report in this issue. Ted Meyer and Steve Upton lead 
sessions on Data Farming Tools: What We Have and Data 
Farming  Tools: What We Need which will be the subject of 
an article in an upcoming issue of The Scythe.
Human Intangibles
Choo Chwee Seng
The objectives of this focus group discussion were to share 
research knowledge on modeling the effects of human 
intangibles and to explore opportunities for 
collaborations.  It started with a recap of the first meeting at 
IDFW 15 in Singapore, followed up quick updates and briefs 
by participants.  The discussions were quite general though, 
and the group agreed to focus on specific topics at IDFW 17 
in   Germany.    Members of the Data Farming Community 
from Singapore will be posting and administering an online 
discussion forum with a repository to share documents.
Naval Simulation System
Michael Atamian
The Naval Simulation System (NSS) is an object-oriented 
multi-sided, multi-warfare modeling and simulation tool 
originally sponsored by CNO N6M. An overview of the 
model history, capabilities, and use cases was presented. 
Specific attention was focused on the ability of the model to 
represent complex C4ISR and its potential ability to integrate 
within the data farming paradigm.
Statistical Aspects of Simulation Software
David Kelton
This plenary provided an overview of the needs for 
statistical analysis capabilities in simulation software.  Input 
parameter analysis, random number generation, optimum 
seeking processes, are examples of the statistical tools that 




The German IT Office of the German Armed Forces, in 
collaboration with EADS, is pushing its Data Farming 
environment and tools to the next stage. With the 
development of a service-oriented architecture for Data 
Farming, the user envisions a new level of user-friendliness. 
The typical phases of an experiment, that is, definition, 
execution and analysis, are manageable within a  single GUI. 
The required input files for the farming process are 
generated within the application (agent-based model) and 
sent via remote access to the cluster. After model execution 
the generated data files will be downloaded and post-
processed in the analysis phase.   
During the plenary session the current GUI-architecture and 
the GUI were presented. The respective Data Farming 
services were remotely accessed from within the Data 
Farming GUI, a simulation experiment was defined and sent 
to a cluster for execution. Presenters included Dr. Dietmar 
Kunde and Thorsten Lampe. 
Automated Co-Evolution: An Update:
Choo Chwee Seng
This plenary session was an update on the Automated Co-
Evolution (ACE) project that DSO is currently working on. 
The objective of ACE is to explore a competitive two-sided 
co-evolution as a mechanism to understand the dynamics of 
competition in a military context through simulations.  The 
brief touched on how ACE was evolved from Automated 
Red Teaming (ART), its key requirements in terms of 
algorithms, fitness functions and co-evolutionary solution 
concepts, and its design considerations.  It ended with 
illustrations of the capability of ACE through some test 
cases.  ACE will be ready for demonstration when the project 
ends in September 2008.
Visual Interactive Simulation and Data 
Farming: How Can They Coexist?
Francois Rioux
Data farming is a well-known approach that builds on 
formal statistical analysis for studying simulated systems. 
Alternatively, users of visual interactive simulation (VIS) 
systems base the changes that are brought to simulation 
parameters on their (intuitive or rational) understanding of 
the system and make decisions of whether or not some 
parameters should change at runtime. VIS analysis is 
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therefore less formal than data farming. However, we claim 
that early phases of data farming such as parameter 
screening or exploratory analysis could benefit from using 
VIS. We argue that complex systems are particularly well-
suited for VIS-based analysis due to characteristics such as 
discovery of emerging behaviors. In this context, we are 
currently developing a generic software framework called 
Multichronia, which implements several VIS features as well 
as a formal representation that tracks users’ decisions 
regarding parameter changes during the execution of a 
simulation. In our work, we investigate how rich interaction 
metaphors with running simulations and data resulting from 
this interaction can assist users to better understand the 
simulated system. Our prototype implementation interfaces 
with a slightly modified version of Pythagoras that allows 
for an executing simulation to be saved in a file and be 
reloaded back into the simulation kernel. At IDFW16 we 
presented the methodology that was adopted for converting 
Pythagoras into an interactive simulator. We also discussed 
the added functionalities that our framework offers and 
discussed the relevance of such an approach in the context of 
data farming.
Health Care Applications of Data Farming
Lawton Clites
The purpose of this presentation was to bring the data 
farming community up to date on the medical modeling 
work being done by the University of Memphis Fedex 
Institute Center for Healthcare and Technology. The 
presentation began with a brief history of the medical 
modeling effort at Memphis, it's connection to the data 
farming community, and the previous models, namely the 
nurse reassignment model, the "day in the life of a paper 
chart" model, and the nurse-patient interaction model. The 
current project of incorporating data from real world 
observations taken by Memphis staff into the model was 
then discussed along with a brief description of the data 
collection process
Pythagoras User's Group 
Gary Horne and Robin Marling
A Pythagoras user's group meeting was held during IDFW 
16.  LT Robin Marling from MCCDC and Dr. Gary Horne 
from NPS led the discussion, which was highlighted by 
reports from participants who are currently using 
Pythagoras.  Many of the users are current NPS students 
working on their Master's theses.  Also during the meeting 
Mr. Rick Clinger from MCCDC presented a Pythagoras 
demonstration.
Advanced Predictive Modeling - TLCM -AT 
Hugh Saint
The Total Life-Cycle Management Assessment Tool (TLCM-
AT) is a discrete-event simulator that uses the Monte Carlo 
method to perform holistic analysis of complex systems' 
logistics.  It breaks down the components of a complex 
system (trackable by individual part number), how each 
platform is used, by location (e.g., varying op tempo, 
reliability, environmental impact, etc.), how it is maintained 
(up to three levels of maintenance), and how the logistics is 
supported and supplied.  Each element is interrelated and 
the associated costs captured.  Then, the technology allows a 
user to conduct Virtual Logistical Wargaming, running 
multiple scenarios to test the impact of varying operational 
and logistical factors; everything from the impacts of an 
operational surge, to changing your support structure (e.g., 
reducing shipping times, repair  times, etc.), to the ROI of 
implementing ECPs (comparing their cost with their impact 
on availability, supply demand, potential logistical cost 
savings, etc.).  All of the modeling outputs are available, via 
GUI, in the form of time-based charts, allowing visual 
comparative analysis of outputs for different scenarios.
The Role of Exploratory Experimental Designs 
in Informing System Requirements
Darryl Ahner
The development of requirements documents for new 
weapon systems may be improved through the application 
of broad exploratory experimental designs in conjunction 
with constructive simulation. The presented methodology 
informs the requirements development process by 
facilitating the efficient exploration of a large number of 
weapon system attributes and the examination of a broader 
range of potential performance parameters for these 
attributes. Used in conjunction with constructive combat 
simulations, the methodology provides the analyst with 
insights into the operational impact of attributes associated 
with a weapon system of interest. The methodology applies 
equally well to deterministic and stochastic models. The 
resulting analysis informs the requirements process of the 
potential impact of a given weapon system and the desired 
performance parameters, as well as the implications of 
building to less than the desired requirements. The 
presented methodology also aids in identifying the most 
critical performance parameters in a given weapon system or 
system of systems. This paper will  provide a case study 
analysis using this methodology to examine performance 
requirements for unmanned systems.
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INTRODUCTION - TEAM 6
The intent of Team 6 activities at the International Data 
Farming Workshop (IDFW) 16 was to explore enhanced 
design of experiment (DOE) techniques and models relevant 
to developing evaluation strategies for testing in a joint 
environment (TIJE).  This goal was met through the 
utilization of the Map Aware Non-uniform Automata 
(MANA) model to trace a “call for fire” (CFF) from the 
originator to the final weapon system, at the detailed level of 
an individual task thread.  A capability-level evaluation 
strategy for battlespace deconfliction tasks was used as the 
scenario driver for the data farming runs.  This evaluation 
strategy has been developed as part of the Joint Test and 
Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) project.  
JTEM is developing and enhancing the Capability Test 
Methodology (CTM) as best practice methods and processes 
for designing and executing testing in a joint environment. 
Part of the problem space JTEM has discovered in developing 
this methodology is when moving from system to system of 
systems (SoS), or to capability-focused test and evaluation, the 
number of factors that are part of the test space grows 
significantly, even exponentially.  Thus, part of the JTEM 
project is the mission to develop processes for refining this test 
space, based on DOE techniques for large factor; multiple 
response designs.
The planning, execution, and analysis of Team 6’s data 
farming activities were completed within the context of the 
CTM’s Develop Evaluation Strategy process.  This process 
includes efficient DOEs, the use of computing clusters, and 
the iterative data farming process.  Questions JTEM 
specifically wanted to focus on during IDFW 16 were: 
• Given a critical joint issue (CJI) for battlespace 
deconfliction, which factors are the most important to 
examine for testing?
• What are some appropriate design of experiment 
techniques that could be applied to the test space?
• What data exploration and analysis methods would be 
appropriate to apply with so many factors?
Scenario
Prior to the actual execution of the workshop, Team 6 began 
to develop the use-case scenario shown in Figure 1.  This 
scenario focuses on a joint forcible entry operation where 
friendly forces would be conducting joint fires, joint close air 
support, and close combat attack operations.  These 
operations would expand a Blue (friendly) force lodgment 
and allow for control of key infrastructure in order to 
facilitate rapid force build-up in the joint operations area 
(JOA).  
Figure 1:  Team 6 Scenario
The developed mission desired effect was for threat 
forces to be destroyed or neutralized in the JOA.  Once this 
scenario was developed, JTEM wanted to analyze different 
DOE techniques considered to be best practice, as well as look 
at promising new DOE techniques under development.  The 
goal was to enhance the CTM methodology and incorporate 
the most current practices being applied in both industry and 
government laboratories.  A screenshot of the MANA scenario 
shows the Blue (friendly) and threat forces with a  list of 
potential influential factors.  The general approach of Team 6 
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during IDFW 16 was to examine the developed scenario, 
apply appropriate DOE techniques, run thousands of 
iterations based on the applied DOE, and then analyze the 
results of the runs.  By exercising this methodology, the team 
hoped to show data farming and DOE applications are 
extremely useful tools for test planning.
TIJE processes must develop critical evaluation issues to 
assess performance as it pertains to capabilities supporting 
joint missions.  To address joint capability contributions to 
achieving desired mission effects, JTEM has developed the 
concept of a CJI.  The CJI for a test should address the 
achievement of mission desired effects, the SoS’ ability to 
accomplish joint operational tasks, and/or the SoS, system, or 
service attribute performance.  The essential elements of a CJI 
include a  capability’s essential tasks, mission desired effects, 
Blue SoS aspects (across Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities--
DOTMLPF), and conditions involving threat and 
environmental factors.  These essential elements are 
contained in the capability crosswalk.   A portion of the 
capability crosswalk for Team 6 is captured in Figure 2.  It is 
important to state how the test issue contributes to achieving 
the desired mission end state outcomes in terms of mission 
desired effects.  The CJIs should address the SoS capability to 
perform joint operational tasks and/or the SoS, system, or 
service attribute performance.  CJIs can be of assistance to the 
appropriate authority when deciding whether to allow the 
SoS to advance to the next phase of development.
Figure 2:  Part of Capability Crosswalk Developed By Team 6
An example CJI format which captures the essential 
elements would be:  Assess the ability to perform Task X by 
SoS configuration Y under Conditions A to achieve mission 
desired effect Z.  For this workshop Team 6 focused on the CJI 
of:  Assess the ability to perform battlespace deconfliction by 
Current/Future Command and Control (C2) SoS under a full range 
of military  operations in order  to achieve  a destroyed or neutralized 
Threat forces in the Joint Operations Area. 
Design of Experiment (DOE)
Team 6 used an efficient DOE approach to screen for both 
continuous and categorical factors that were candidate key 
factors in influencing the SoS effectiveness.  There is an 
evaluate-analyze-evaluate (EAE) iteration flow in the CTM 
used to refine the Evaluation Strategy as shown in Figure 3. 
Team 6 used this EAE approach to prioritize factor 
importance and compared the results to the expected factor 
performance to see if it was consistent with experience of 
team subject matter experts (SMEs).  This process began by 
defining more than forty-seven different factors with levels 
that were summarized in the capability crosswalk.  MANA 
was the agent-based simulation tool available to use for data 
farming runs. 
Figure 3:  CTM Test Space Refinement
The capability crosswalk was mapped to a Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube design and multiple iterations 
were run through the MANA model on the NPS cluster to 
provide results for further analysis and refinement of test 
factors.  The team analyzed the responses to these runs to see 
if they were feasible and if expected factors were actually the 
most statistically significant.  Throughout the week, daily 
replications of this process, each with numerous runs, were 
used to refine the test factors, based on a mission measure of 
effectiveness related to threat combat in a joint mission 
environment.  The output from the initial test runs did not 
follow predicted factor importance.  This outcome surprised 
many of the team members.  However, further analysis of 
the MANA model highlighted possible limitations to the 
model, which were explored in subsequent DOE excursions. 
It was agreed that since the thrust of the week’s effort was to 
exercise DOE processes within the CTM, the team could 
accept the apparent doctrinal, tactical, and performance 
inconsistencies in the output.  The DOE process proved to be 
very valuable and supportive of the JTEM approach for 
including DOE in its methodology.  Initially Team 6 had 
planned on running the scenario in both the MANA and 
Tester models.  However, Tester was not available, which 
limited the scope of the analysis due to modeling constraints 
of MANA. Nonetheless, the team was able to achieve and 
exemplify a best practice of what could be done utilizing 
DOE with respect to test planning. 
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Analysis
Using MANA simulation results, data was processed and 
analyzed in order to assess SoS, threat, and environment 
factor importance relating to a mission measure of 
effectiveness.  Some of the analysis outputs captured by the 
team are highlighted in Figures 4, 5, and 6.  In Figure 4, the 
team applied classification and regression tree (CART) 
analysis output to analyze the Mission MOE concerning 
Proportion of Threat System Casualties.  In this design, the 
most statistically significant factor was a forward observer 
(FO) “PassSelf” parameter, which turned Blue FO self 
reporting on or off.  This PassSelf factor accounted for an R 
squared coefficient of determination of .587, implying that a 
least squares regression model relating PassSelf factor to the 
Mission Measure of Effectiveness (MMOE) can explain 
approximately 58% of the MMOE variation.  
Figure 4:  CART output for Red Casualties 1st Split (Left)
The partition plot in Figure 4 shows a No PassSelf parameter 
(no Blue FO self reporting) led to a  better desired effect of 
threat system casualties.  Similar analysis was completed to 
determine which variables had a smaller impact, such as the 
number of Red agents.  Along with this analysis Pareto Plots 
(see Figure 5) and Prediction Profiler plots (see Figure 6) 
were used to model the factors that captured all main effects 
as well as stepwise effects chosen from all second order 
terms, with adjusted R squared values of .685 and .782 
respectively.  The adjusted R squared was essential for this 
analysis as it adjusts to the number of independent variables 
and sample size.  While not as high of an R squared as 
preferable in smaller factor, controlled experiments, the 
analysis did inform the factor  refinement of this large test 
space, which had a combination of 32 continuous and 3 
categorical factors.
Figure 5:  Pareto Plot of Model Terms of All Main Effects (Right)
Figure 6:  Profiler for 8 Most Important Factors
Insights and Issues for Further Investigation
Future data farming efforts would be more robust if they 
incorporated a comparison of data from both the MANA and 
Tester (or other models).  Much of the situational awareness 
(SA) defined for this workshop utilizing MANA was 
modeled as the actual communications links both between 
and among entities.  However the importance of C2 factors 
may have been underestimated.  Further analysis of 
statistically significant C2 factors and refinement of model 
scenarios to better align with doctrine may provide more 
robust analysis.  For example, if a tank battalion is down to 
40% strength, and the 40% consists of the support platoon 
(ammunition and fuel), cooks, maintenance personnel, then 
that battalion has little to no fire power and would most 
likely not continue the offensive. The current MANA model 
treats many of the different elements as equal, which is not 
as realistic as MANA removing a unit (Blue or Red) from the 
fight when it reached a point of being combat ineffective. 
However a  model is just a  representation of the systems of 
systems “that should be used to try and gain some insights 
into the relationships among the various components or to 
predict performance under some new conditions being 
considered.”1
For this analysis the attrition of Red and Blue forces was 
analyzed to assess the difference between the current and 
future SoS.  Due to time constraints, this was the only MMOE 
or task measure of performance (TMOP) analyzed.  Future 
investigations could expand the focus of the evaluation of this 
measure through an attack on the center of gravity for Red 
forces and then assess the impact of the loss of critical C2 
nodes on Threat force attrition.  However, due to the limited 
capabilities of Agent Based Models (ABMs), we should not 
throw out Red force losses and loss exchange ratios for 
MOEs.  MOE enhancements can include weighting critical 
Red forces so all Red forces are not counted the same.  For 
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1 “Simulation, Modeling, and Analysis” Averill M. Law and W. David Kelton, p.1. 
instance, the early elimination of Red air  defenses could be 
deemed as an important desired effect achieved by joint fires 
and close air  support tasks.  Working with the MANA ABM 
provided an excellent opportunity to identify some needed 
capabilities to support MMOE and TMOP evaluations.  It also 
provided the opportunity to identify new design aspects for 
the Tester model being developed.  The developer for Tester 
was a Team 6 member and throughout the week’s event he 
noted some critical aspects of C2 for future incorporation into 
future model enhancements.  This immediate feedback to 
ABM developers is a key benefit which enhances future data 
farming workshops.  
Having design of experiment expertise from Naval 
Postgraduate School, Research Development and Engineering 
Command (RDECOM) and TRADOC Research and Analysis 
Center allowed Team 6 to compare different designs to the 
same experimental space (NOLH, R5FF, others).  This 
capability, combined with the application of different 
analytical techniques (e.g., linear regression, Kriging) allowed 
the team to gain valuable insights into the C2 SoS ability to 
perform battlespace deconfliction.  Within the IDFW 16 venue, 
Team 6 began analyzing more than forty-eight different 
factors in the DOE.  These factors were modeled in the 
MANA model and thousands of iterations were run to gain 
insights on the test factors and test factor interrelationships. 
The statistical output was then analyzed in order to validate 
the significance of test factors and interrelationships.  This 
process allowed the team to indicate where models need to be 
changed, and where other factors or interrelationships may 
need to be modeled.  Analysis of the data and utilization of 
analytic best practices such as sensitivity analysis, CART, and 
visualization/ analytical tools were applied to turn test data 
into insights including an evaluation of the overall joint 
mission effectiveness and the contribution a C2 SoS makes to 
the accomplishment of that joint mission.  The IDFW 16 
Workshop allowed all team members to apply a use-case 
focused on battlespace deconfliction to see how joint mission 
effectiveness test space refinement is accomplished by 
examining the test structures, identifying test factors and test 
factor interrelationships through the application of analytical 
techniques to identify factors of importance, factor levels of 
impact, and important interrelationships. 
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The United States Marine Corps continually works to shape 
logistics plans and policies in order to sustain excellence in 
combat effectiveness.  Total Life Cycle Management (TLCM) 
is a vital part of the Marine Corps’ vision of developing a 
force that is capable of performing and successfully 
completing the vast array of missions expected to be 
performed during the 21st Century.  In an effort to improve 
the life-cycle management of assigned weapon systems, the 
Marine Corps contracted Clockwork Solutions to develop a 
tool capable of simulating life-cycle sustainment costs and 
performance metrics of operations, maintenance and supply 
for new and legacy weapon systems.  Clockwork Solutions 
developed such a tool and named it Total Life Cycle 
Management-Assessment Tool (TLCM-AT).
During the IDFW-16, we focused our efforts on exploring 
several parameters and assumptions using TLCM-AT on a 
Marine Light Armored Vehicle (LAV-25).  Our analysis 
involved the employment of the Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) to help develop several scenarios based 
on a range of inputs for five critical parameters.  Each scenario 
was replicated using TLCM-AT and the results were later 
analyzed in search of significant factors.  
TLCM-AT Tool and NOLH
TLCM-AT is a stochastic modeling and simulation analysis 
tool developed by Clockwork Solutions.  The tool’s main 
objective is to provide a simplified representation of a 
system at some particular point in time intended to promote 
the understanding of the real system.  Using this tool could 
enable decision makers and logisticians to perceive in a 
matter of minutes interactions and behaviors that would 
normally unfold over a very long time.  
Clockwork Solutions included in the delivery of TLCM-
AT five models covering the following weapon platforms:
• Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
• Light Armored Vehicle-25 (LAV-25)
• Lightweight 155mm howitzer (LW155)
• Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
Each of these models is implemented using a Microsoft 
Access 2003 database file.  TLCM-AT uses these files to control 
both inputs and outputs, which are saved into the same file. 
In the context of this report a database file representing a 
weapon system will be called a model.   
Using the provided LAV-25 baseline model, we ran the 
simulation tool 30 times and collected the results to determine 
the top ten LAV-25 degrading parts.  This process of 
determining problem parts is done using a formula provided 
by Clockwork Solutions on their LAV-25 final report.  The 
process uses the output from the out Waiting time and 
Unavailability output table.  The formula is used to create a 
degrader index for each part on the weapon system.  The 
formula is:
Waiting Time * Requests * (Unavailability+1)
Later parts are sorted by decreasing degrader index to 
determine the top ten degraders.  
Employing the NOLH tool to efficiently maximize our 
sample space, we varied the starting state of the top ten 
degrader parts by varying five initial input parameters of each 
degrader.  The five parameters controlled for our experiment 
are:
• Spare Levels (Total number of spares at each location)
• Induction Quantity (A limit on the number of 
inductions that can occur in the given quarter and 
year)
• Capacity (Number of parts that can be processed 
concurrently)
• Service Times (Time to service the part)
• Unscheduled Removal Rates (Part failure rate)
The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) used was 
Operational Availability (Ao).  Ao is defined as the number of 
operational platforms divided by the total number of 
platforms available fleet-wide at the end of 20 operational 
quarters.  Table 1 shows the list of experiments in NOLH 
design format.  Each row in Table 1 defines one experiment; 
later we will describe how these values are implemented into 
a model.
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Table 1: NOLH Design
Design Implementation
Each design was implemented using Table 1 as a guide.  The 
factor names are Spare for spare levels, IQ for induction 
quantity, I Cap for capacity at the I- Level, Deg for 
unscheduled removal rates and ST for service times.  The 
value of spare levels, induction quantity and capacity were 
set to the value on the NOLH for each degrader part.  In the 
case of service times and unscheduled removal rates the 
current values of those parameters were multiplied by the 
value on the NOLH.     
Data Generation and Flow
Due to the cumbersome nature of manipulating Access files 
manually, we were forced to create a Java application that 
could do the job for us.  Figure 1  describes the process of 
design development and data generation flow.  We were able 
to implement a Java tool that copies our baseline model into 
a working model that TLCM-AT can recognize when 
launched from the command line.  Once the working model 
is created, our Java tool modifies the model to reflect the next 
design on the experiment; it then launches TLCM-AT from 
the command line.  Our tool completes the process by 
collecting the necessary output from the current working 
model so it can be saved before a new working model 
representing the next design is created.
Figure 1: Data Generation and Flow
The output from our simulation is a CSV file containing 
every design value as listed on Table 1 and the achieved Ao 
for that design.  
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Figure 2 shows how each design compares with respect to 
our MOE.  The small difference range among all designs is 
explained by the fact that we only varied our parameters on 
ten parts.  Limiting our analysis to only ten parts 











Figure 2: Operational Availability per design
Our initial analysis involved a main-factor-only multiple 
linear regression model.  We expected to identify some 
significant main factors during this portion of the analysis, but 
surprisingly that was not the case.  Figure 3 shows the 
parameter estimates for  the linear regression model. The 
lowest p-value included on this model is 29 percent and the R-
Squared equaled 17 percent strongly suggesting that this 
model is not adequate.  
Figure 3: Main Factors Regression Model 
Our next step was to include second order interactions on 
our model perform stepwise regression to determine 
significant factors and interactions.
Figure 4: Regression Model with Interactions 
In this case it was discovered that the interaction among 
spares, capacity and degradation times was the most 
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significant factor on the model.  Figure 4 shows the Parameter 
Estimates for the regression model including second order 
interactions. The subsequent significant factors are 
interactions between spares and degradation times, capacity 
and degradation times and the main factor degradation times 
(significant in the presence of other factors).    
Figure 5 shows the order of significance of all factors 
included on the model.  R Squared for this latest model 
equaled 97 percent.
Figure 5: Parameter Estimates in Order of Significance
CONCLUSIONS
The results from this analysis are specific to the LAV model 
provided to us by Clockwork Solutions and it applies to the 
set of adjusted parameters and the way they were changed. 
The main conclusion is that investing in any one given 
resource in order to improve Operational Availability would 
not provide the best result if the underlying interactions 
among factors are not explored carefully.  Running a base 
case scenario and comparing the results to those obtained by 
changing one factor at a time simply will not allow the 
analyst to estimate the interactions (synergies) among the 
many factors.  From the initial results that were obtained 
during the workshop, one can clearly see that the interaction 
of the factors analyzed had the most significant impact on 
Operational Availability of the LAV.  Decision makers need 
to consider the best mix of resources to maximize Ao; clearly 
the use of tools such as the TLCM-AT, combined with design 
of experiments, can provide insight into these interactions.
THE WAY AHEAD
During the previous months and during IDFW-16, a process 
has been developed to use DOE and the NOLH with the 
TLCM-AT.  A simple scenario was used to test the mechanics 
of the Java implementation, and interesting results were 
obtained.  The work accomplished here opens the door for 
researchers in the future to apply these techniques to real-
world scenarios.  Commonly, decision-makers are presented 
with several courses of action (COA) when trying to decide 
how to maintain material readiness of complex weapons 
systems.  Each COA can be individually modeled in the 
TLCM-AT database, and design of experiments can be used 
to explore the significant factors that affect the desired end 
state for the fleet of a particular weapons system. 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two years TNO and Dstl developed an Agent 
Based Combat ID Model to support the research on factors 
influencing the success and failure of Combat Identification 
processes. During the International Data farming Workshop 
(IDFW) 15 in Singapore, we evaluated this model by 
conducting the first data  farming experiments. The model 
represents Situation Awareness (SA) and the cognitive 
processes to combine new sensor input with SA in order to 
make identification decisions. A description of the model 
and the results of the Singapore experiments can be found in 
[ref 1]. 
A more general treatment about an architecture for 
placing the human at the centre of a constructive simulation, 
which also contains a more extensive description of this agent 
based Combat ID model, can be found in the ICCRTS 2008 
paper [ref 2]
This paper describes the progress we made with the 
model development since IDFW 15 and the results from the 
data farming experiments we conducted during IDFW 16 in 
Monterey. In a few paragraphs an overview will be given of 
the new features, the objectives, the design of the experiments 
and the results.  We will conclude this paper with lessons 
learned, conclusions and future developments.
New Features 
Based on our “development master plan” and the results of 
IDFW 15, we enhanced the Combat ID model with a number 
of new features that are described below.
1. The new Combat ID model incorporates a much 
richer set of Measures of Merit (MoM). Each MoM 
is characterized by three dimensions:
o decision (3 values: blue, red or green)
o ground truth (3 values: blue, red or green)
o object type (3 values: tank, car or person)
These three dimensions result in 27 MoM that give 
an accurate and detailed picture of the successes 
and failures of identification for  each type, e.g. the 
combination (decision=red, ground truth=blue, 
type=car) gives the number of fratricide incidents 
where cars are involved.  
2. The identifying agent(s) use(s) the more realistic 
ACQUIRE sensor model, developed by Night 
Vision Laboratory (NVL). This model takes into 
account characteristics on:




Although in principle, all parameters can be 
dynamic or can be “data farmed on,” the first three 
are held constant during IDFW 16. The last one is 
dependent on the type of object encountered. Apart 
from the characteristics mentioned, the output of 
the sensor model is dependent on the distance of 
the identifying agent to the object. The relation 
between distance and probability of detection, 
classification and identification take the shape of an 
“S-curve” as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1:  The probability curves for 
Detection, Recognition, and Identification.
3. The processing of sensor input has been changed. 
The following steps are involved.
o The agent calls the ACQUIRE algorithm to 
get a probability of detection.
o If the probability of detection is above a 
certain, data farmable threshold, a 
stochastic function determines whether the 
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agent indeed detects the object or “misses” 
it. This corresponds to the situation that 
the user does not pay attention to the 
sensor or simply overlooks the object. The 
probability for missing is inversely 
proportional  to the probability of 
detection, but involves a “rolling the dice” 
mechanism.
o After detection, the agent makes a rough 
assessment how much closer it needs to go 
in order to make an identification.  It 
makes a movement “on the safe side” of 
this assessment.
o After making the calculated movement, 
the agent uses the sensor data and the 
ACQUIRE algorithm to determine the 
probability distribution (blue, red, green) 
of the objects identity and combines this 
with its preconception distribution 
(situation awareness) in order to get the 
new belief distribution about the identity 
of the object. As in previous versions, it 
uses the information acceptance curves for 
this purpose. If the resulting value is 
below the decision threshold, the 
process starts again until either an 
identification decision can be made or 
the agent is as close as a hundred 
meters from the target. If the last 
condition is the case, the agent leaves 
the object alone and focuses on other 
objects.
As in previous versions of the model, the whole 
process also involves dynamic adaptations of the 
preconception grid of the agent and modification of the 
Measures of Merit if the agent takes a decision.
Objectives of IDFW 16
The objectives of the study during IDFW 16 are:
• Evaluate the  new features described above
• Get insight on the effects and relative importance of 
influencing parameters and establish a foundation for 
further model improvements. 
Design of Experiments
As the basis for our experiments, we use a Near Orthogonal 
Latin Hypercube (NOLH) with 16 parameters. These 
parameters deal with the number of objects for each type (3 
parameters), the distribution of those objects on the screen (3 
parameters), the distribution of the preconception (3 
parameters), the shape of the information acceptance curves 
(2 parameters), the radius of the circle in which the agent 
tries to detect objects, the decision threshold, the size of the 
local SA grid, the size of global SA cells and finally the 
surprise level. Most of the parameters are explained in 
[ref 1], with the difference that we use different parameters 
for the distribution of preconceptions that make them 
relative to the ground truth.
In our current design we use data farmable parameters 
for the correlation between ground truth and perceived truth 
and for the mixture of objects. These parameters are not 
directly settable, but are derived from others like the centers of 
ground truth for red, green and blue and the parameters for 
the relative distance of perceived to ground truth. These 
dependent variables make sure that the results are based on 
variables that do not contain interdependencies anymore.
During IDFW 16, we performed three data farming runs 
with basically the same design, but with different data points 
in the hypercube of all possible design points. Also, we looked 
at the outcomes of the initial runs to fine tune the maximum 
delta of the perceived truth compared to the ground truth and 
to limit the maximum number of steps. 
RESULTS
The description of the results in this paragraph is limited to 
two examples and is, by far, not exhaustive. Results are 
omitted because of limited space, the detailed nature of the 
results, and the lack of a clear graphical visualization of 
them. For those interested, more detailed analysis will be 
available later this year. 
Figure 2 shows the relation between the fraction of 
samples and the percentage of objects that were correctly or 
incorrectly identified by the agent after 10.000 steps. The 
graph is based on results of the second experiment. 
Figure 2: The fraction of samples related to the percentage of 
identified objects after 10000 steps. 
The figure shows that for roughly half of the samples  80 
percent or less of the total number of objects are identified. For 
the other half of the samples, 80 percent or more of the objects 
are identified.  It also shows that the relation is almost linear. 
Regression analysis shows that the decision threshold is the 
most significant factor influencing the percentage of decisions. 
The second most important factor is the Y-intercept-indicator, 
a variable responsible for the shape of the information 
acceptance curve. A flatter curve caused more correct 
decisions. The flatter the curve the more the agent is open for 
new information in the case of  extreme values of 
preconception (strong belief).
Figure 3 shows a regression tree for the third experiment, 
with the relationship between the importance of input 
parameters and the percentage of fratricide. The tree shows 
that the most important factor responsible for fratricide is the 
ratio by which an area with blue ground truth is misconceived 
as red (by the initial preconception). 
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Figure 3: The regression tree for the fratricide measure of 
Merit. The R2 of this metamodel is 0.63.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS
IDFW brought us a step further towards a mature Combat 
ID agent based simulation model. Although  the results still 
have to be analyzed in detail, our first impression is that our 
Combat ID model in combination with the data farming 
approach is a good method to get insight into the parameters 
that influence the success and failures in Combat ID 
processes. However, it is important to keep a close 
connection between the experiments and the customer 
questions and we feel that we need to take a  number of 
measures to ensure this in the future. This is reflected in the 
lessons learned below:
The lessons learned from IDFW 16 are:
• Although data  farming is a good approach to get 
quick results in an iterative way based on a large 
number of model runs, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the questions that needs to be 
answered. In hindsight, we feel that we lacked a 
detailed enough and shared question to steer our 
process of discovery. Future workshops will need 
better preparation with respect to the questions to be 
answered.
• Good analysis tools are essential for data farming. 
Although we had tools available for data analysis, the 
lack of a good graphic representation of results made 
it hard to get quick insights in the meaning of the 
results. This hindered the depth of analysis during a 
workshop severely. 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
During IDFW16 we started with the development of the next 
version of the Combat ID agent based model. Contrary to the 
current version, where an agent moves around in a world 
that is defined by parameters that determine, for example, 
the number of objects and their distribution, as well as the 
initial  preconception, this new version will be scenario-
driven and will focus on a limited number of data farmable 
parameters like decision threshold, situation awareness and 
information processing characteristics. The reasons to go to 
this model style are that a scenario driven model:
• is closer to the mental model of 
the customer,
• enables us to simulate historical 
incidents, and
• gives more control on the 
behavior of the model. 
In the new version, the setup of the 
scenario will be handled in a 
separate “setup” application. The 
scenario can be stored and then 
imported into the “execute” 
application.
New features of this scenario driven 
version will be:
•Both the Ground Truth distribution 
and the Perceived Truth 
distribution can be defined manually in a separate 
“scenario” application. 
• More than one identifying agent can be defined. Each 
agent will have its’ own characteristics, SA and 
behavior. This includes levels of training and 
experience, and the consequences of this on the 
identification process.
• The route of agents and objects can be defined in 
terms of waypoints (instead of the current semi-
random movement)
• The scenario can be written to a file with a specified 
name. This file can be imported by the Combat ID 
“execution” application.
We plan to develop and test this scenario driven version 
of our Combat ID model before September 2008 and use 
IDFW 17 in Garmish Partenkirchen to conduct data farming 
experiments with this model. We will develop two or three 
scenarios as the basis for our analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION
Representing Urban Culture Geography in Stability 
Operations concerns the representation of the civilian 
population in a conflict environment. This working group 
used a  scenario developed for Pythagoras and a scenario 
developed for a prototype multi-agent system model of the 
civilian population to explore the response of the civilian 
population to insurgent, government and stability force 
actions in a  counterinsurgency environment. The working 
group also examined potential measures of merit from recent 
work by an irregular warfare modeling and analysis 
working group.
This article describes the effort associated with the prototype 
multi-agent system model of the civilian populace with a 
focus on developing the data associated with a notional 
scenario to execute the model in a high performance 
computing environment with an experimental design. The 
ultimate motivation behind the multi-agent system model is 
to create a scenario and run the simulation model to 
understand how actions, information, perceptions and 
beliefs affect public opinion about the legitimacy of the host 
nation’s government. This workshop was the first test of that 
emerging model.  
MODEL
The version of the prototype used during the workshop had 
limited initial functionality consisting of civilian population 
entities, select beliefs and positions held by those entities, the 
social network connecting the population entities, and a set 
of actions influencing the population entities.
Civilian population entities represent typical members of 
the society. They may represent individuals, families, clans or 
tribes depending on the resolution desired and the data 
available during scenario development. Civilian population 
entities are cognitive agents in the multi-agent system. Most 
other agents like the stability forces, host nation entities, 
insurgents, and others are reactive agents consisting of 
relatively simple scripts to represent plans and simple 
behaviors to represent policies in response to actions.
Central to the civilian population entities are the 
positions they hold on matters of public importance and the 
underlying beliefs that support those positions. These agents 
process information about events in the model and about 
objects in the environment that they observe. This information 
influences their beliefs and positions.
Civilian population entities are directly influenced by 
action events and indirectly influenced by other agents in the 
social network. Action events take the form of positions on an 
issue along with beliefs associated with that issue. The social 
network connects the population entities and provides for the 
exchange of information among entities. When a population 
entity processes an action influence the agent may decide to 
pass it along to one or more agents in its social network.
SCENARIO
The scenario was derived from the Peace Support 
Operations Model (PSOM) Ginger Junction scenario used in 
the MORS Irregular Warfare (IW) Workshop in December 
2007. That scenario is a disaster relief operation complicated 
by an active insurgency. The RUCG-SO Ginger Junction 
scenario follows the broad outline of that scenario with 
scripted behaviors and events for most actors and an 
enhanced focus on the civilian population’s response.
In total there were 86 population entities distributed 
across four population groups: Northern Natives, Northern 
Others, Southern Natives and Southern Others. The social 
network represents affective ties in the population. The 
existence of a relationship is symmetric, but the strength of the 
relationship is not symmetric.
Issues identified in the Ginger Junction scenario include 
Southern Independence, Land Reform, Increased Crime, 
Distribution of Disaster Relief Aid, Distribution of Wealth, 
Representation in Legislature, Participation in Government, 
and Government Mismanagement of Budget. For this 
experiment two representative and related issues, Southern 
Independence and Land Reform, were examined. 
The issue of Southern Independence has four possible 
positions: Status Quo, Federalism, Autonomy and 
Independence. This issue is influenced by three population 
entity beliefs: fairness of political participation, belief that 
southern natives (called Little Buddies) are inferior, and views 
on the role of government.
The issue of Land Reform has three possible positions: 
Status Quo, Minor Reform (e.g., making land available for 
ownership by the poor, squatters, etc.), and Major Reform 
(e.g., redistributing land or government control of land, etc.). 
This issue is influenced by two population entity beliefs: 
legitimacy of current land ownership and perceptions about 
the current plantation system.
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Figure 1 is an example of the initial  beliefs and positions 
of an agent depicted as a Bayesian belief net. We used Netica 
4.02 by Norsys Software Corporation for this research relying 
on the graphical user interface for data development and 
using the Java Application Programmers Interface (API) in the 
multi-agent system implementation. 
Figure 1: Southern Native #15 Initial Beliefs and Positions 
(using Netica 4.02 byNorsys Software Corporation).
The underlying data for this belief net was derived by 
taking a set of representative survey data for the individual 
agent’s population group and randomly selecting a subset of 
the survey results for this agent. Each case in the survey data 
represents the response from a single member of the 
population surveyed on his issue position and related belief 
stances. This method of random selection from within an 
agent’s population group produces agents representative of 
the group with a reasonable distribution of beliefs and 
positions. 
It is important to note that the agent’s position on issues 
and stance on beliefs is not like a single response to a survey. 
Instead one may interpret the internal representation of the 
agent’s issues and beliefs in a few ways. First, you might 
consider the agent as an individual and view the weighting 
on issue positions or belief stances as his tendency to support 
that position. In a simple case like Southern Native #15’s 
belief that Political Participation is Fair  we observe that his 
initial belief is balanced between Mostly False at 54.5% and 
Mostly True at 45.5%. That agent leans slightly toward Mostly 
False. 
Second, we might consider the agent as representing 
more than one individual with the weighting of each belief 
stance representing the proportion supporting that stance. As 
a practical matter, the model will use the data associated with 
beliefs and positions in the same way.
The events in the scenario are in the form of effects, 
which we call action influences because they translate actions 
in the scenario into their  influence on population entity beliefs 
and positions. Each action influence supports one set of beliefs 
and one issue position. Table 1 is Action Influence #198 
depicted as a  data table in the form that is processed by the 
model. This Action Influence supports the status quo for land 
reform based on the belief in a fully legitimate system of land 
ownership and the goodness of the current plantation system. 
Note that this example has data for the issue position and 
stances on both related beliefs; however, the multi-agent 
system implementation can process action influences that 
consist of partial information.
Table 1:  Action Influence #198 
as a Data Table for Processing by the Model.
The weight of the action effect depends on the strength of 
relationship between the influenced agent and the influencing 
agent in the social network. In the experimental scenario there 
are 200 candidate action influences. The number and type 
included in each scenario depends on the action influence 
factor setting. In Versus there are 140 action influences; in 
Neutral there are 144 and Equal there are 149.
An action influence is directed at one or more of the four 
population groups. Of the 200 candidate action influences, 27 
target the entire population, 42 target the Northern Natives, 40 
the Northern Others, 66 the Southern Natives and 25 the 
Southern Others. Forty-two action effects occur in only one 
design point; 83 in two; and 75 in all three. All Land Reform 
action influences occur in all three design points.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experimental design had two factors each with three 
settings configured in a full factorial  design as depicted in 
Table 3. 
Table 2: Experimental Design.
The first factor was action influences for Southern 
Independence. We varied the distribution of action influences 
in the scenario. In the Neutral factor setting action influences 
support each of the four positions in the same proportion as 
was initially found in the overall population. In the Versus 
factor setting action influences supporting the two extreme 
positions, Status Quo and Independence, were increased to 
account for 90% of the influences in equal weight with the 
remaining 10% of the action influences supporting the two 
centrist positions, Federalism and Southern Autonomy, in 
equal weight. In the Equal factor setting action influences 
supporting each of the four positions were the same. 
The second factor was density of the social network. The 
Base factor setting has the baseline social network, which is 
relatively dense. The Medium factor setting is about half as 
dense as the baseline social network. The Low factor setting is 
about a quarter as dense as the baseline social network. While 
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a population entity is more likely to have more and stronger 
ties in the social network with members of the same 
population group, social ties cross population group 
boundaries.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We successfully executed ten replications of each of the nine 
design points in the experimental design after making some 
fine tuning adjustments to the model and data. Data was 
collected on each state change for each agent. Analysis of the 
resulting data indicates that the multi-agent system model 
functioned as expected.
Varying the Action Influences related to Southern 
Independence resulted in significantly different issue 
positions on Southern Independence in line with the nature of 
the distribution of action influences. Neutral had only a  minor 
impact while Equal and Versus had more of an impact and 
moved the issue positions toward the expected results.
Varying the Social Network Density resulted in 
significantly more state changes in the design points with a 
denser social  network. The resulting movement in issue 
positions was more pronounced in dense networks than less 
dense social networks. We noted that the model was sensitive 
to the probability that an agent passed along an action 
influence in his social network.
Not varying the Action Influences related to the Land 
Reform issue served as a useful control on the experiment. 
The expected response occurred with little difference among 
design points with the same social network density and 
statistically significant differences between design points with 
differing densities.
This experiment is the first experience with the multi-
agent system. It provides a sound basis for continued testing 
and development of analytical  methods going forward. Over 
the next year, the multi-agent system will be significantly 
enhanced to better represent civilian populations in stability 
operations based on social science theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Joint starting conditions (JSC) are the generated set of initial 
conditions that are provided a combat model for its use 
within a study or analysis. These conditions include such 
data as starting Blue and Red common operational pictures 
(COPs), starting unit locations, starting unit statuses (force 
strength/attrition effects and current logistics state), etc. A 
particular scenario provides the context and the JSC apply to 
a specific starting point within that scenario (e.g., Day D+27). 
Currently JSC development is executed primarily using 
Subject Matter Expert (SME) input, discussion, and 
adjudication for spreadsheet tools and separate attrition and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) models. 
The results are often not repeatable and can be driven by 
dominant personalities. 
As part of the TRADOC Analysis Center's (TRAC's) 
structured scenario development process, the Joint Dynamic 
Allocation of Fires and Sensors (JDAFS) model is being 
reviewed as a tool to support JSC data development. JDAFS is 
a discrete event simulation that accounts for first-order 
combat effects using Army approved algorithms. It couples 
the dynamic, optimized allocation of resources (such as 
unmanned platforms and artillery assets) to a simulation in 
order to render better representations of network-enabled 
warfare. The process to use JDAFS has four main points of 
effort. First, identify the full  range of stating conditions and 
associated factors that must be accounted for in the JSC 
process. Second, identify those JSC data that can be developed 
using model and simulation (M&S) support - clearly 
capturing and recognizing the interaction between M&S data 
and non-M&S supported data. Third, identify and execute 
appropriate M&S enhancements to support JSC data 
development. Fourth, develop an appropriate Design of 
Experiment (DOE) front end to support sensitivity analysis 
and alternative starting conditions. 
APPROACH TO JOINT STARTING 
CONDITIONS
When using high-resolution ground combat simulations, 
scenarios often do not start running in these high-resolution 
simulations on D-day. For instance, if the high-resolution 
starts on D+10, then initial conditions for the high-resolution 
simulations must be developed. The process for setting these 
initial  conditions often has relied on a single ISR expert to 
determine detection and identification percentages. Then, an 
air campaign expert determines the destruction percentage 
and dispersion of remaining enemy assets throughout the 
area of operation. This overall process is difficult to defend 
to an analysis review board which brings into question the 
results of the high-resolution runs due to the lack of 
traceability to certifiable algorithms and experimental 
performance data when setting these initial conditions. A 
repeatable, traceable process that is approved by the 
scenario, intelligence, threats, and Joint community is 
desired. 
High-Resolution simulations use the JSC data to 
represent the intelligence preparation of the battlefield that all 
military units perform prior to major operations. By providing 
a traceable methodology of determining these initial starting 
conditions, the high-resolution simulations, which are already 
traceable and whose results are well  accepted by senior 
military leaders, can provide defendable results to senior 
military decision makers.
The goals of Team #10 were:
• Refine and test a Joint battlespace shaping scenario 
that represents ISR asset allocation/trade-offs and 
kinetic effects in JDAFS. 
• Develop a data farming interface (or at least 
requirements for one) that lends itself to analyst ease-
of-use and provides a range of potential starting 
conditions. 
• Identify and define appropriate improvements to 
JDAFS to better represent joint shaping assets and that 
result in traceable realistic Joint Starting Conditions 
for high-resolution ground combat simulations.
JDAFS
The JDAFS simulation is a publicly available, discrete event 
simulation that accounts for first order combat effects using 
Army-approved algorithms. It couples the dynamic 
allocation of resources, such as unmanned platforms and 
artillery assets, to a simulation to render better 
representations of network enabled warfare.  The United 
States Army TRADOC Analysis Center has supported the 
development of JDAFS for the past several years.
JDAFS implements an entity-level, “low-resolution” 
approach to simulation modeling.  Units are not modeled to 
the level of detail present in high-resolution models such as 
COMBATXXI.  Algorithms, such as for detection and 
adjudication of weapons effects, are designed to capture first-
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order effects without the time-consuming detail present in the 
high-resolution models. 
The starting condition input parameters that the high-
resolution simulations require fall into three categories: unit, 
geographical and operating environment parameters.  The 
problem of determining appropriate JSC is one of determining 
these parameters following an initial phase of the battle just 
prior to the operation of real interest.  Therefore, traditional 
analysis with one, or a relatively few, number of output 
measures is not a good fit to this problem.
This output from this effort is different than the output 
that is typically obtained from a combat simulation in that it is 
the end state rather than measures of performance of entities 
within the simulation that is desired. It is important that a 
range of starting conditions is available so that expert 
judgment can be used to determine whether the follow-on, 
high-resolution simulation runs should begin with a best-case, 
a worst-case, or an average case situation. 
The base-case approach taken was to identify some key 
measures and perform a simple frequency analysis on the 
results.  For each measure, three output conditions were 
identified.  These corresponded to the “best,” “worst,” and 
“most likely” cases.  Specifically, the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentile runs are identified based on the frequency 
distribution of the measure, and these correspond to the 
“best,” “most likely,” and “worst” cases respectively. 
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
The scenario consisted of Blue, Red, and Neutral (Civilian) 
units.  Blue assets included ground, air, and surface (Navy) 
units.  Red assets included ground and air defense units.  A 
notional display of the force locations at the start of the 
scenario is shown in Figure 1.   
Figure 1: Joint Starting Conditions Scenario
A snapshot of the base case scenario implemented in 
JDAFS at the beginning of the run is shown in Figure 2.  Red 
and Blue units are shown in their respective colors, while 
circles represent Civilian units.
The unit positions at the end of one replication are 
shown in Figure 3.  The X’s represent casualties.
Design of Experiments
In order to facilitate the execution of multiple scenarios 
according to an experimental design, a  modular approach 
was developed.  Two databases were processed by a  Java 
program that generated the JDAFS input databases, as 
shown in Figure 4.
The Template database consists of a complete base-case 
scenario for JDAFS. The Design database consists of two 
tables.  One identifies the factors in the Template database by 
table, column, and an optional value.  The second table points 
to the particular designs, based on the quantity of parameters 
varied in the DOE.
Figure 2: Joint Starting Conditions Scenario in JDAFS
Figure 3: Base Case Scenario at End of Replication
Figure 4: Generation of Input Databases
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Analysis of Base Case
As noted above, setting joint starting conditions does not 
lend itself to traditional analysis, since there are no Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOEs) that are ultimately of interest. 
Rather, the outputs of interest consist of the possible JSCs for 
the next phase of the operation. Thus, the outputs are highly 
multivariate, consisting of all unit positions, dispositions, 
and strengths as well as the perception of the enemy. That is, 
the output is a COP for the enemy and/or friendly forces.
The base case was replicated independently 100 times for 
the initial analysis. The measures chosen to examine were 
Blue casualties and Red casualties.  The distribution of Blue 
casualties is shown in Figure 5.  The distribution shows 
nothing particularly unusual.  The mode is 8, occurring in 21 
out of 100 scenarios.
Figure 5: Distribution of Blue Casualties
The distribution of Red casualties is shown in Figure 6. 
This shows an interesting bimodal pattern.  Although the 
mode is between 500 and 550 casualties, there are also many 
that were between 50 and 100.
Figure 6: Distribution of Red Casualties
Examining the frequency of casualties by percentile is 
another way to identify scenarios of interest.  This is shown in 
Table 1, which identifies the 0.25. 0.50, and 0.75 percentile 
replications.  Additionally, the replication is captured so that 
the results for that condition can be traced.
Percentile Blue Casualties (Replication) Red Casualties (Replication)
0.25 4 (17) 98 (95)
0.50 6 (94) 234 (41)
0.75 8 (52) 511 (79)
Table 1: Percentiles of Casualties by Side
Design of Experiments
An experimental design was run with seven factors, three 
being the optimization intervals (used by the model to set 
the frequency of optimization for use by the fires, sensor, and 
unmanned scheduling algorithms) within JDAFS, and the 
remaining four being the maximum Electro-Optical (EO) 
sensor ranges for  four different Blue platforms.  This resulted 
in 17 design points, each of which had 30 replications.  Each 
replication took approximately 2 minutes on a laptop 
computer, and the entire set of runs was executed overnight. 
In a high-performance computing environment (i.e., a 
cluster) the turnaround time would have been quite rapid.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The analysis of the previous section could be used to identify 
a small set of representative or interesting scenarios for the 
next phase of the study.  That is, the ending conditions of the 
JDAFS replication corresponding to the given scenarios 
would be used to set the JSCs for the next model’s runs. 
Currently, it is straightforward to convert these dispositions 
into starting conditions for more runs using JDAFS.   Thus, 
JDAFS could be a valuable tool for a panel of subject matter 
experts in adjudicating possibilities.  This would be an 
improvement over the current approach
Several future improvements to the JDAFS simulation to 
better represent the setting of JSC were identified. These 
improvements included:
• Better representation of stand-off ISR missions.
• Implement enemy detection states (positional, 
functional).
• Better representation of aircraft refueling.
• Capability for units to first become available later in 
the simulation run.
• Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for the 
JDAFS simulation run.
• Further refine Generalized DOE Interface. 
• Finalize an input method to execute multiple DOE 
configurations.
• Merge output files into a common database to 
facilitate follow-on analysis.
• Execute final version of the joint starting conditions 
scenario. 
Further Work
JDAFS shows great promise as a tool to enhance the setting 
of joint starting conditions.  In addition to additional JDAFS 
function improvements, further work includes finalizing and 
testing the DOE capabilities and refining the user interface. 
Improved automation of output analysis is also desirable, 
especially formatting the output reports to be more 
amenable for use by statistical packages.
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INTRODUCTION
Crowd confrontations are a common occurrence.  In the Free 
World, peaceful protest is a human right.  However, when a 
crowd becomes violent, control forces need to step in to 
restore order.  They should do this with minimum but 
sufficient force.  The use of Non-Lethal Weapons has been 
promoted to ensure a continuum of force between the simple 
presence of the control forces and the use of lethal weapons. 
However, the strategy and tactics for the employment of 
Non-Lethal Weapons is not well developed.
The following study is part of a three-year project by the 
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis in Defence 
Research and Development Canada in cooperation with Laval 
University of Quebec City.  The first year of the project was 
devoted to literature review on the socio-psychological nature 
of crowd behaviour.  The second year of the project was 
devoted to modeling and simulation using agent-based 
methods by Laval University and the System Dynamics 
model by the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis. 
The project is currently in the third and final year and will 
concentrate on analysis of modeling results.  This paper will 
discuss the analysis of the System Dynamics model using the 
Design of Experiments approaches promoted by the SEED 
(Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs) Center at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.
GOALS
The goals of this analysis of the System Dynamics model of 
Crowd Confrontations and Non-Lethal Weapons are to:
• Determine the most sensitive parameters in the 
current model in order to potentially simplify the 
model or at least focus the data collection efforts for 
future application of the model.
• Develop a robust set of Rules of Engagement for the 
employment of Non-Lethal Weapons by applying the 
model to a diverse set of scenarios.
OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
Following the approach suggested by Coyle [1], the problem 
statement was developed in some detail.  The primary 
concern of the study was to determine the effective use of 
Non-Lethal Weapons from the strategic perspective. 
Namely, there are strategic and tactical decisions concerning 
both the benefits of controlling a crowd that becomes unruly, 
and the costs of either making the situation worse by not 
doing enough or being perceived as using excessive force 
through the employment of Non-Lethal Weapons.
After recognizing the complex nature of the problem, a 
qualitative model was developed to understand its important 
dynamic nature.  Figure 1 provides an influence diagram that 
was generated early in the modeling effort.
The central feature of this diagram is the crowd 
aggressiveness level.  The controllers have an accepted 
aggressiveness level that they will allow, while the instigator/
leaders and the violent crowd members have a desired 
aggressiveness level that they are wishing to achieve.  Based 
on the discrepancy between the actual crowd aggressiveness 
and the accepted aggressiveness, the controllers will 
determine their tactics.  Similarly, the instigator/leaders and 
violent crowd members determine their actions based on the 
discrepancy between their desired crowd aggressiveness and 
the actual crowd aggressiveness. 
Figure 1: Influence Diagram of Crowd Confrontation Situation
These interactions lead to a series of negative feedback 
loops.  There are also two positive feedback loops that involve 
the media.  Control force tactics and crowd aggressiveness 
leads to media interest and this influences controller tactics 
and instigator/leader and violent crowd member actions.
The next step in the modeling process was to develop a 
series of quantitative models based on System Dynamics 
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Stocks and Flows.  Quantitative models were developed to 
examine:
• The Crowd Dynamics with Bystanders/Pacifists, 
Violent Crowd Members, and Instigator/Leaders of 
various age categories and both genders.
• The Actions of the Violent Crowd Members and the 
Instigators/Leaders in terms of provocation, violence 
against property, or violence against the Control Force.
• The Tactics of Controllers with options to use such 
Non-Lethal Weapons as tear gas, plastic bullets, water 
cannons, etc.
These sub-models were interrelated by the various 
decision processes of the individual agents in the model. 
Thus, the actions of the crowd and the instigator leaders affect 
the crowd dynamics and the decisions of the controllers.  The 
actions of the controllers affect the crowd dynamics and the 
actions of the violent crowd members and instigator/leaders.
The detailed documentation of the model is available in 
[2]. 
MODELING PARAMETERS
The philosophy of system dynamics is that it is better to 
have a crude estimate of an important parameter than to 
ignore the parameter because a good estimate of its value 
cannot be obtained.  By not including a parameter, one is 
implicitly assuming that its impact is zero.  However, in this 
model 227 parameters have been included and the goal is to 
determine which of these parameters are most important to 
the future analysis.  There are four types of parameters that 
are explicitly modeled:
a. Observables – such as number of people in the 
various groups of various types, and actions carried 
out by these people of various types. 
b. Change rates in the observables – such as number 
of people joining or departing the groups, the 
increasing or decreasing rate of actions by the 
people, the effects of the observables on the rates, 
etc.
c. Thresholds that determine tactics – such as the level 
of crowd aggressiveness that will trigger the use of 
various Non-Lethal Weapons by the Controllers, 
and the level of crowd aggressiveness that will 
cause the Instigator/Leaders to take actions.
d. Strategic targets – such as the acceptable level of 
crowd aggressiveness that the Controllers will 
allow, and the desired level of crowd 
aggressiveness that the Instigator/Leaders wish to 
achieve.
Some of these parameters, such as the number of 
Bystanders/Pacifists initially in the crowd, are scenario 
dependent.  Some of the parameters are theoretically 
determined, such as the tactical effects of Non-Lethal 
Weapons on the crowd behaviour. Some of them are 
controllable by the agents, such as the Thresholds that 
determine the tactical use of Non-Lethal Weapons, and the 
strategic values related to acceptable and desired levels of 
aggressiveness.
Because of their importance to the understanding of the 
central feature of the model, namely the aggressiveness levels, 
Tables 1 and 2 are provided to show how the aggressiveness 
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4 Defensive Move and Tear Gas
5 Water Cannon
6 Defensive Move and Water Cannon
7 Tear Gas and Water Cannon
8 Defensive Move, Tear Gas and Water Cannon
9 Plastic Bullets
10 Defensive Move and Plastic Bullets
11 Tear Gas and Plastic Bullets
12 Defensive Move, Tear Gas and Plastic Bullets
13 Water Cannon and Plastic Bullets
14 Defensive Move, Water Cannon and Plastic Bullets
15 Tear Gas, Water Cannon and Plastic Bullets
16 Defensive Move, Tear Gas, Water Cannon and Plastic Bullets
17 Offensive Move
18 Tear Gas and Offensive Move
19 Water Cannon and Offensive Move
20 Tear Gas, Water Cannon and Offensive Move
21 Plastic Bullets and Offensive Move
22 Tear Gas, Plastic Bullets and Offensive Move
23 Water Cannon, Plastic Bullets and Offensive Move
24 Tear Gas, Water Cannon, Plastic Bullets and Offensive Move
Table 2: Controller Aggressiveness Categorization
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DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
To achieve the goals of the team, two experiments were run: 
one to determine the sensitive parameters in the model; and 
one to develop a robust set of rules of engagement.
The first experiment involved a two-level fractional 
factorial design, which required 512 simulation runs.
The second experiment involved a cross-design. For the 
22 “controllable” tactical and strategic parameters, a nearly 
orthogonal Latin hypercube was used.  This required 129 
simulation runs.  For the remaining 183 “uncontrollable” 
parameters, a two-level saturated design was required.  This 
involved 256 simulation runs.  Therefore, 129 times 256 or 
33,024 simulation runs were required for the entire 
experiment.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Sensitivity of the Parameters
The 512 runs for the two-level fractional factorial design took 
only five minutes on a laptop computer because the System 
Dynamics model is purely deterministic. Therefore, data 
farming was not required.
The aggressiveness of the crowd and the aggressiveness 
of the controllers were summed in the model to determine the 
overall level of aggressiveness that would be minimized in the 
ideal world.  Two types of statistical analysis were conducted 
on the results of the 512 simulation runs: stepwise regression 
and a partition tree.
With the stepwise regression, 21 parameters entered the 
model and were able to account for  30% of the deviation in 
the results.  Eleven of these were considered controllable (i.e., 
associated with factors influencing control forces strategies). 
Among them, five are used to determine the tactics of 
controllers (e.g., tear gas and plastic bullet thresholds).  These 
controllable elements would need to be determined to reduce 
aggressiveness to a minimum.  Ten parameters were 
considered uncontrollable (i.e., associated with factors 
influencing the crowd members).  For example, the effect of 
“illegitimacy” is an important factor.  The uncontrollable 
elements would need to be estimated accurately, based on the 
scenario or the theoretical foundations of the model.  As 
predicted, many of the controllable factors (5 out of 10) made 
the top 10 list.
With the partition tree, again 21 parameters entered the 
solution.  However, they were a different set of parameters, 
which included only 6 controllable parameters and 15 
uncontrollable parameters.  The model was able to account for 
50% of the deviation in the results.  Some elements, such as 
the effect of illegitimacy, come later in the order of importance 
in the partition tree than in the case of stepwise regression. 
However, one of the uses of the partition tree approach is the 
ability to develop rules of engagement directly from the 
results.
Robustness of the Rules of Engagement
The first thing that was done to evaluate the robustness of 
the rules of engagement was to develop a “loss function.” 
This was not difficult—since the goal was to minimize the 
total aggressiveness in the scenario, the “loss function” that 
was chosen was the maximum aggressiveness in the scenario 
squared.
The mean loss was then determined for each of the 129 
controllable parameter runs by averaging all 256 of the 
uncontrollable parameter runs.
Stepwise regression and a partition tree were applied to 
the 129 simulation results, with the independent variable 
being the mean loss.
A stepwise regression was conducted using all 22 main 
factors, all two- and three-way interactions and all quadratics. 
Thirty-eight variables entered the model: 15 main effects, 21 
interaction effects and 2 quadratic effects.  This model 
accounted for  90% of the deviation in the results.  The results 
confirmed that the thresholds of soft tactics, such as 
communication and use of cameras, do not have a 
considerable impact on the aggressiveness of the event. 
Conversely, the use of plastic bullets and water cannons has a 
considerable impact.  This model could easily be used to 
determine a robust set of tactical thresholds and strategic 
goals of the controllers over all possible scenarios that might 
be faced.
The partition tree results were somewhat less satisfying 
since only five partitions were possible, even though they 
represented only 78% of the deviation in the results.
FUTURE WORK
Using this model with an efficient design of experiments, it 
is hoped that a robust set of rules of engagement can be 
developed that will minimize aggressiveness of the crowd 
with minimum force applied by the controllers.  There are 
two approaches that will be examined:
• A set of scenario-independent rules of engagement 
that can be applied to all possible situations.
• A two-player style measure-counter measure 
approach that adapts the rules of engagement to the 
developing dynamics of the situation.
The first set of rules might be useful for doctrinal 
documentation on Non-Lethal Weapons employment.  The 
second, more dynamic rules, might be useful for training 
simulations and Red Team/Blue Team gaming.
The 2010 Winter Olympics will be held in Vancouver, 
British Columbia and the Canadian Forces are currently 
making plans to support the games with security capabilities. 
There have already been indications that attempts will be 
made to disrupt the games by anti-poverty protesters and 
native groups [3].  With the eyes of the world on Canada 
through the international media, it will be imperative to 
handle any disruptions expeditiously, but carefully. 
Therefore, the optimal use of Non-Lethal Weapons is currently 
of great interest to the Canadian Forces, and supporting the 
2010 Olympic Games planners with doctrine and training 
could be one of the immediate benefits of this work.
In the longer term, the introduction of design of 
experiments to verify and validate models in the Centre for 
Operational Research and Analysis, Defence Research and 
Development Canada, the Systems Dynamics Society, and the 
modelling and simulation community through presentations 
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of this work, would be an admirable goal for the Team 11 
members.
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International Data Farming Workshop 17
When: 21 - 26 September 2008
Where: Dorint Sporthotel, Garmisch Partenkirchen, Germany
Hotel information available at (http://www.dorint.com/en/hotel-garmisch-partenkirchen/trustbooker)
Hotel Information:
Mrs. Tatjana Fuchs (Tatjana.Fuchs@dorint.com); Tel.: +49 8821 / 706 - 603; Fax.: +49 8821 / 706 - 618
The room rates are: Single: € 117; Double: € 168. The Workshop Fee is € 410, and will be collected by the hotel. If you 
have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Mrs. Tatjana Fuchs at the hotel or the SEED Center's administrative 
assistant, Debbie Sandoval either by email: dasandov@nps.edu or by phone: 831.656.2683.
Please go to http://harvest.nps.edu/ at the IDFW 17 link for additional information and registration.
Tentative Agenda
Sunday, September 21: Opening reception and dinner.
Monday, September 22: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Thursday, September 23 - 25: Work in teams (optional plenary sessions in the mornings) at NPS
Friday, September 26: Outbriefs and closing ceremony in the morning.
Call for Team 
Leaders / Plenary 
Speakers:
Please email 
gehorne@nps.edu with your 
choice of teams and if you 
want to lead a team or 
present a plenary briefing. 
Conference Fee:
The registration fee is €410  
Registration pays for:
• Conference rooms                                           •  Opening dinner
• Lunch, Break food and drinks •  CD & conference materials
• New one-year membership card with quote       •  Fun
The Data Farming CD/DVD, if provided, 
will be attached here. For additional 
copies of the CD or of the Scythe please 
contact Ted Meyer 
(tedmeyer@mac.com)
Scythe - Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community
Issue 4 - Workshop 16
Seed Center for Data Farming
273 Glasgow Hall ~ Naval Postgraduate School ~ Monterey, CA 93950
